We give some attacks on the DBL hash modes MDC-4 and MJH. Our preimage attack on the MDC-4 hash function requires the time complexity O(23n/2) for the block length n of the underlying block cipher, which significantly improves the previous results. Our collision attack on the MJH hash function has a time complexity less than 2124 for n=128. Our preimage attack on the the MJH compression function finds a preimage with the time complexity of 2n. It is converted to a preimage attack on the hash function with the time complexity of O(23n/2). As far as we know, any cryptanalytic result for MJH has not been published before. Our results are helpful for understanding the security of the hash modes together with their security proofs.
Deukjo HONG
the Attached Institute of ETRI
Daesung KWON
the Attached Institute of ETRI
The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.
Copy
Deukjo HONG, Daesung KWON, "Cryptanalysis of Double-Block-Length Hash Modes MDC-4 and MJH" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E97-A, no. 8, pp. 1747-1753, August 2014, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1747.
Abstract: We give some attacks on the DBL hash modes MDC-4 and MJH. Our preimage attack on the MDC-4 hash function requires the time complexity O(23n/2) for the block length n of the underlying block cipher, which significantly improves the previous results. Our collision attack on the MJH hash function has a time complexity less than 2124 for n=128. Our preimage attack on the the MJH compression function finds a preimage with the time complexity of 2n. It is converted to a preimage attack on the hash function with the time complexity of O(23n/2). As far as we know, any cryptanalytic result for MJH has not been published before. Our results are helpful for understanding the security of the hash modes together with their security proofs.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1747/_p
Copy
@ARTICLE{e97-a_8_1747,
author={Deukjo HONG, Daesung KWON, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Cryptanalysis of Double-Block-Length Hash Modes MDC-4 and MJH},
year={2014},
volume={E97-A},
number={8},
pages={1747-1753},
abstract={We give some attacks on the DBL hash modes MDC-4 and MJH. Our preimage attack on the MDC-4 hash function requires the time complexity O(23n/2) for the block length n of the underlying block cipher, which significantly improves the previous results. Our collision attack on the MJH hash function has a time complexity less than 2124 for n=128. Our preimage attack on the the MJH compression function finds a preimage with the time complexity of 2n. It is converted to a preimage attack on the hash function with the time complexity of O(23n/2). As far as we know, any cryptanalytic result for MJH has not been published before. Our results are helpful for understanding the security of the hash modes together with their security proofs.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1747},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={August},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Cryptanalysis of Double-Block-Length Hash Modes MDC-4 and MJH
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1747
EP - 1753
AU - Deukjo HONG
AU - Daesung KWON
PY - 2014
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1747
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E97-A
IS - 8
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - August 2014
AB - We give some attacks on the DBL hash modes MDC-4 and MJH. Our preimage attack on the MDC-4 hash function requires the time complexity O(23n/2) for the block length n of the underlying block cipher, which significantly improves the previous results. Our collision attack on the MJH hash function has a time complexity less than 2124 for n=128. Our preimage attack on the the MJH compression function finds a preimage with the time complexity of 2n. It is converted to a preimage attack on the hash function with the time complexity of O(23n/2). As far as we know, any cryptanalytic result for MJH has not been published before. Our results are helpful for understanding the security of the hash modes together with their security proofs.
ER -