IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Scan-Based Side-Channel Attack on the Camellia Block Cipher Using Scan Signatures
Summary :
Camellia is a block cipher jointly developed by Mitsubishi and NTT of Japan. It is designed suitable for both software and hardware implementations. One of the design-for-test techniques using scan chains is called scan-path test, in which testers can observe and control the registers inside the LSI chip directly in order to check if the LSI chip correctly operates or not. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information from the cryptosystem using scan chains. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method on the Camellia cipher using scan signatures. Our proposed method is based on the equivalent transformation of the Camellia algorithm and the possible key candidate reduction in order to retrieve the secret key. Experimental results show that our proposed method sucessfully retrieved its 128-bit secret key using 960 plaintexts even if the scan chain includes the Camellia cipher and other circuits and also sucessfully retrieves its secret key on the SASEBO-GII board, which is a side-channel attack standard evaluation board.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E98-A No.12 pp.2547-2555
- Publication Date
- 2015/12/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2547
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on VLSI Design and CAD Algorithms)
- Category
- Logic Synthesis, Test and Verification
Authors
Huiqian JIANG
Waseda University
Mika FUJISHIRO
Waseda University
Hirokazu KODERA
Waseda University
Masao YANAGISAWA
Waseda University
Nozomu TOGAWA
Waseda University
Keyword
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Huiqian JIANG, Mika FUJISHIRO, Hirokazu KODERA, Masao YANAGISAWA, Nozomu TOGAWA, "Scan-Based Side-Channel Attack on the Camellia Block Cipher Using Scan Signatures" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E98-A, no. 12, pp. 2547-2555, December 2015, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2547.
Abstract: Camellia is a block cipher jointly developed by Mitsubishi and NTT of Japan. It is designed suitable for both software and hardware implementations. One of the design-for-test techniques using scan chains is called scan-path test, in which testers can observe and control the registers inside the LSI chip directly in order to check if the LSI chip correctly operates or not. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information from the cryptosystem using scan chains. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method on the Camellia cipher using scan signatures. Our proposed method is based on the equivalent transformation of the Camellia algorithm and the possible key candidate reduction in order to retrieve the secret key. Experimental results show that our proposed method sucessfully retrieved its 128-bit secret key using 960 plaintexts even if the scan chain includes the Camellia cipher and other circuits and also sucessfully retrieves its secret key on the SASEBO-GII board, which is a side-channel attack standard evaluation board.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2547/_p
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@ARTICLE{e98-a_12_2547,
author={Huiqian JIANG, Mika FUJISHIRO, Hirokazu KODERA, Masao YANAGISAWA, Nozomu TOGAWA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Scan-Based Side-Channel Attack on the Camellia Block Cipher Using Scan Signatures},
year={2015},
volume={E98-A},
number={12},
pages={2547-2555},
abstract={Camellia is a block cipher jointly developed by Mitsubishi and NTT of Japan. It is designed suitable for both software and hardware implementations. One of the design-for-test techniques using scan chains is called scan-path test, in which testers can observe and control the registers inside the LSI chip directly in order to check if the LSI chip correctly operates or not. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information from the cryptosystem using scan chains. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method on the Camellia cipher using scan signatures. Our proposed method is based on the equivalent transformation of the Camellia algorithm and the possible key candidate reduction in order to retrieve the secret key. Experimental results show that our proposed method sucessfully retrieved its 128-bit secret key using 960 plaintexts even if the scan chain includes the Camellia cipher and other circuits and also sucessfully retrieves its secret key on the SASEBO-GII board, which is a side-channel attack standard evaluation board.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2547},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={December},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Scan-Based Side-Channel Attack on the Camellia Block Cipher Using Scan Signatures
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2547
EP - 2555
AU - Huiqian JIANG
AU - Mika FUJISHIRO
AU - Hirokazu KODERA
AU - Masao YANAGISAWA
AU - Nozomu TOGAWA
PY - 2015
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2547
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E98-A
IS - 12
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - December 2015
AB - Camellia is a block cipher jointly developed by Mitsubishi and NTT of Japan. It is designed suitable for both software and hardware implementations. One of the design-for-test techniques using scan chains is called scan-path test, in which testers can observe and control the registers inside the LSI chip directly in order to check if the LSI chip correctly operates or not. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information from the cryptosystem using scan chains. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method on the Camellia cipher using scan signatures. Our proposed method is based on the equivalent transformation of the Camellia algorithm and the possible key candidate reduction in order to retrieve the secret key. Experimental results show that our proposed method sucessfully retrieved its 128-bit secret key using 960 plaintexts even if the scan chain includes the Camellia cipher and other circuits and also sucessfully retrieves its secret key on the SASEBO-GII board, which is a side-channel attack standard evaluation board.
ER -
English
