We present a rebound attack on the 4-branch type-2 generalized Feistel structure with an SPS round function, which is called the type-2 GFN-SPS in this paper. Applying a non-full-active-match technique, we construct a 6-round known-key truncated differential distinguisher, and it can deduce a near-collision attack on compression functions of this structure embedding the MMO or MP modes. Extending the 6-round attack, we build a 7-round truncated differential path to get a known-key differential distinguisher with seven rounds. The results give some evidences that this structure is not stronger than the type-2 GFN with an SP round function and not weaker than that with an SPSP round function against the rebound attack.
Le DONG
Henan Normal University,the Mathematics and Scientific Computing Key-Disciplines Laboratory
Tianli WANG
North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power
Jiao DU
Henan Normal University,the Mathematics and Scientific Computing Key-Disciplines Laboratory
Shanqi PANG
Henan Normal University,the Mathematics and Scientific Computing Key-Disciplines Laboratory
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Le DONG, Tianli WANG, Jiao DU, Shanqi PANG, "Known-Key Attacks on Type-2 GFN with SPS Round Function" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E99-A, no. 7, pp. 1488-1493, July 2016, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E99.A.1488.
Abstract: We present a rebound attack on the 4-branch type-2 generalized Feistel structure with an SPS round function, which is called the type-2 GFN-SPS in this paper. Applying a non-full-active-match technique, we construct a 6-round known-key truncated differential distinguisher, and it can deduce a near-collision attack on compression functions of this structure embedding the MMO or MP modes. Extending the 6-round attack, we build a 7-round truncated differential path to get a known-key differential distinguisher with seven rounds. The results give some evidences that this structure is not stronger than the type-2 GFN with an SP round function and not weaker than that with an SPSP round function against the rebound attack.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E99.A.1488/_p
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@ARTICLE{e99-a_7_1488,
author={Le DONG, Tianli WANG, Jiao DU, Shanqi PANG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Known-Key Attacks on Type-2 GFN with SPS Round Function},
year={2016},
volume={E99-A},
number={7},
pages={1488-1493},
abstract={We present a rebound attack on the 4-branch type-2 generalized Feistel structure with an SPS round function, which is called the type-2 GFN-SPS in this paper. Applying a non-full-active-match technique, we construct a 6-round known-key truncated differential distinguisher, and it can deduce a near-collision attack on compression functions of this structure embedding the MMO or MP modes. Extending the 6-round attack, we build a 7-round truncated differential path to get a known-key differential distinguisher with seven rounds. The results give some evidences that this structure is not stronger than the type-2 GFN with an SP round function and not weaker than that with an SPSP round function against the rebound attack.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E99.A.1488},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={July},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Known-Key Attacks on Type-2 GFN with SPS Round Function
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1488
EP - 1493
AU - Le DONG
AU - Tianli WANG
AU - Jiao DU
AU - Shanqi PANG
PY - 2016
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E99.A.1488
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E99-A
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - July 2016
AB - We present a rebound attack on the 4-branch type-2 generalized Feistel structure with an SPS round function, which is called the type-2 GFN-SPS in this paper. Applying a non-full-active-match technique, we construct a 6-round known-key truncated differential distinguisher, and it can deduce a near-collision attack on compression functions of this structure embedding the MMO or MP modes. Extending the 6-round attack, we build a 7-round truncated differential path to get a known-key differential distinguisher with seven rounds. The results give some evidences that this structure is not stronger than the type-2 GFN with an SP round function and not weaker than that with an SPSP round function against the rebound attack.
ER -