Hash-based IP traceback is a technique to generate audit trails for traffic within a network. Using the audit trails, it reconstructs not only the true attack paths of a Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS attack), but also the true path of a single packet attack. However, hash-based IP traceback cannot identify attacker nodes themselves because it has no audit trail on the subnet's layer-2 network under the detected leaf router, which is the nearest node to an attacker node on a layer-3 network. We propose a layer-2 extension to hash-based IP traceback, which stores two identifiers with packets' audit trails while reducing the memory requirement for storing identifiers. One of these identifiers shows the leaf router's interface through which an attacking packet came, and the other represents the ingress port on a layer-2 switch through which the attacking packet came. We implement a prototype on FreeBSD and evaluate it in a preliminary experiment.
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Hiroaki HAZEYAMA, Masafumi OE, Youki KADOBAYASHI, "A Layer-2 Extension to Hash-Based IP Traceback" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E86-D, no. 11, pp. 2325-2333, November 2003, doi: .
Abstract: Hash-based IP traceback is a technique to generate audit trails for traffic within a network. Using the audit trails, it reconstructs not only the true attack paths of a Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS attack), but also the true path of a single packet attack. However, hash-based IP traceback cannot identify attacker nodes themselves because it has no audit trail on the subnet's layer-2 network under the detected leaf router, which is the nearest node to an attacker node on a layer-3 network. We propose a layer-2 extension to hash-based IP traceback, which stores two identifiers with packets' audit trails while reducing the memory requirement for storing identifiers. One of these identifiers shows the leaf router's interface through which an attacking packet came, and the other represents the ingress port on a layer-2 switch through which the attacking packet came. We implement a prototype on FreeBSD and evaluate it in a preliminary experiment.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/e86-d_11_2325/_p
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@ARTICLE{e86-d_11_2325,
author={Hiroaki HAZEYAMA, Masafumi OE, Youki KADOBAYASHI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={A Layer-2 Extension to Hash-Based IP Traceback},
year={2003},
volume={E86-D},
number={11},
pages={2325-2333},
abstract={Hash-based IP traceback is a technique to generate audit trails for traffic within a network. Using the audit trails, it reconstructs not only the true attack paths of a Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS attack), but also the true path of a single packet attack. However, hash-based IP traceback cannot identify attacker nodes themselves because it has no audit trail on the subnet's layer-2 network under the detected leaf router, which is the nearest node to an attacker node on a layer-3 network. We propose a layer-2 extension to hash-based IP traceback, which stores two identifiers with packets' audit trails while reducing the memory requirement for storing identifiers. One of these identifiers shows the leaf router's interface through which an attacking packet came, and the other represents the ingress port on a layer-2 switch through which the attacking packet came. We implement a prototype on FreeBSD and evaluate it in a preliminary experiment.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={November},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - A Layer-2 Extension to Hash-Based IP Traceback
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 2325
EP - 2333
AU - Hiroaki HAZEYAMA
AU - Masafumi OE
AU - Youki KADOBAYASHI
PY - 2003
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN -
VL - E86-D
IS - 11
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - November 2003
AB - Hash-based IP traceback is a technique to generate audit trails for traffic within a network. Using the audit trails, it reconstructs not only the true attack paths of a Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS attack), but also the true path of a single packet attack. However, hash-based IP traceback cannot identify attacker nodes themselves because it has no audit trail on the subnet's layer-2 network under the detected leaf router, which is the nearest node to an attacker node on a layer-3 network. We propose a layer-2 extension to hash-based IP traceback, which stores two identifiers with packets' audit trails while reducing the memory requirement for storing identifiers. One of these identifiers shows the leaf router's interface through which an attacking packet came, and the other represents the ingress port on a layer-2 switch through which the attacking packet came. We implement a prototype on FreeBSD and evaluate it in a preliminary experiment.
ER -