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We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 2^{2} when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.

- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E102-D No.2 pp.299-306

- Publication Date
- 2019/02/01

- Publicized
- 2018/11/16

- Online ISSN
- 1745-1361

- DOI
- 10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168

- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER

- Category
- Information Network

Yang GAO

State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing

Yong-juan WANG

State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing

Qing-jun YUAN

State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing

Tao WANG

State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing

Xiang-bin WANG

State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing

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Yang GAO, Yong-juan WANG, Qing-jun YUAN, Tao WANG, Xiang-bin WANG, "Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E102-D, no. 2, pp. 299-306, February 2019, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168.

Abstract: We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 2^{2} when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.

URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168/_p

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@ARTICLE{e102-d_2_299,

author={Yang GAO, Yong-juan WANG, Qing-jun YUAN, Tao WANG, Xiang-bin WANG, },

journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},

title={Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS},

year={2019},

volume={E102-D},

number={2},

pages={299-306},

abstract={We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 2^{2} when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.},

keywords={},

doi={10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168},

ISSN={1745-1361},

month={February},}

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TY - JOUR

TI - Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS

T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information

SP - 299

EP - 306

AU - Yang GAO

AU - Yong-juan WANG

AU - Qing-jun YUAN

AU - Tao WANG

AU - Xiang-bin WANG

PY - 2019

DO - 10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168

JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information

SN - 1745-1361

VL - E102-D

IS - 2

JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information

Y1 - February 2019

AB - We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 2^{2} when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.

ER -