IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS
Summary :
We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 22 when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E102-D No.2 pp.299-306
- Publication Date
- 2019/02/01
- Publicized
- 2018/11/16
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1361
- DOI
- 10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Information Network
Authors
Yang GAO
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
Yong-juan WANG
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
Qing-jun YUAN
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
Tao WANG
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
Xiang-bin WANG
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Yang GAO, Yong-juan WANG, Qing-jun YUAN, Tao WANG, Xiang-bin WANG, "Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E102-D, no. 2, pp. 299-306, February 2019, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168.
Abstract: We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 22 when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168/_p
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@ARTICLE{e102-d_2_299,
author={Yang GAO, Yong-juan WANG, Qing-jun YUAN, Tao WANG, Xiang-bin WANG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS},
year={2019},
volume={E102-D},
number={2},
pages={299-306},
abstract={We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 22 when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={February},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 299
EP - 306
AU - Yang GAO
AU - Yong-juan WANG
AU - Qing-jun YUAN
AU - Tao WANG
AU - Xiang-bin WANG
PY - 2019
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E102-D
IS - 2
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - February 2019
AB - We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 22 when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.
ER -
English
