Security Evaluation of Negative Iris Recognition

Osama OUDA; Slim CHAOUI; Norimichi TSUMURA

doi:10.1587/transinf.2019EDP7276

Security Evaluation of Negative Iris Recognition

Osama OUDA, Slim CHAOUI, Norimichi TSUMURA

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Biometric template protection techniques have been proposed to address security and privacy issues inherent to biometric-based authentication systems. However, it has been shown that the robustness of most of such techniques against reversibility and linkability attacks are overestimated. Thus, a thorough security analysis of recently proposed template protection schemes has to be carried out. Negative iris recognition is an interesting iris template protection scheme based on the concept of negative databases. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of this scheme in order to validate its practical usefulness. Although the authors of negative iris recognition claim that their scheme possesses both irreversibility and unlinkability, we demonstrate that more than 75% of the original iris-code bits can be recovered using a single protected template. Moreover, we show that the negative iris recognition scheme is vulnerable to attacks via record multiplicity where an adversary can combine several transformed templates to recover more proportion of the original iris-code. Finally, we demonstrate that the scheme does not possess unlinkability. The experimental results, on the CASIA-IrisV3 Interval public database, support our theory and confirm that the negative iris recognition scheme is susceptible to reversibility, linkability, and record multiplicity attacks.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E103-D No.5 pp.1144-1152

Publication Date: 2020/05/01

Publicized: 2020/01/29

Online ISSN: 1745-1361

DOI: 10.1587/transinf.2019EDP7276

Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Biological Engineering

Authors

Osama OUDA
  Jouf University,Mansoura University
Slim CHAOUI
  Jouf University,Sfax University, SETIT-Lab
Norimichi TSUMURA
  Chiba University

Keyword

biometric template protection, negative iris recognition, irreversibility, attacks via record multiplicity, linkability attacks

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Osama OUDA, Slim CHAOUI, Norimichi TSUMURA, "Security Evaluation of Negative Iris Recognition" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information, vol. E103-D, no. 5, pp. 1144-1152, May 2020, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2019EDP7276.
Abstract: Biometric template protection techniques have been proposed to address security and privacy issues inherent to biometric-based authentication systems. However, it has been shown that the robustness of most of such techniques against reversibility and linkability attacks are overestimated. Thus, a thorough security analysis of recently proposed template protection schemes has to be carried out. Negative iris recognition is an interesting iris template protection scheme based on the concept of negative databases. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of this scheme in order to validate its practical usefulness. Although the authors of negative iris recognition claim that their scheme possesses both irreversibility and unlinkability, we demonstrate that more than 75% of the original iris-code bits can be recovered using a single protected template. Moreover, we show that the negative iris recognition scheme is vulnerable to attacks via record multiplicity where an adversary can combine several transformed templates to recover more proportion of the original iris-code. Finally, we demonstrate that the scheme does not possess unlinkability. The experimental results, on the CASIA-IrisV3 Interval public database, support our theory and confirm that the negative iris recognition scheme is susceptible to reversibility, linkability, and record multiplicity attacks.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2019EDP7276/_p

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@ARTICLE{e103-d_5_1144,
author={Osama OUDA, Slim CHAOUI, Norimichi TSUMURA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Security Evaluation of Negative Iris Recognition},
year={2020},
volume={E103-D},
number={5},
pages={1144-1152},
abstract={Biometric template protection techniques have been proposed to address security and privacy issues inherent to biometric-based authentication systems. However, it has been shown that the robustness of most of such techniques against reversibility and linkability attacks are overestimated. Thus, a thorough security analysis of recently proposed template protection schemes has to be carried out. Negative iris recognition is an interesting iris template protection scheme based on the concept of negative databases. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of this scheme in order to validate its practical usefulness. Although the authors of negative iris recognition claim that their scheme possesses both irreversibility and unlinkability, we demonstrate that more than 75% of the original iris-code bits can be recovered using a single protected template. Moreover, we show that the negative iris recognition scheme is vulnerable to attacks via record multiplicity where an adversary can combine several transformed templates to recover more proportion of the original iris-code. Finally, we demonstrate that the scheme does not possess unlinkability. The experimental results, on the CASIA-IrisV3 Interval public database, support our theory and confirm that the negative iris recognition scheme is susceptible to reversibility, linkability, and record multiplicity attacks.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2019EDP7276},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={May},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Security Evaluation of Negative Iris Recognition
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 1144
EP - 1152
AU - Osama OUDA
AU - Slim CHAOUI
AU - Norimichi TSUMURA
PY - 2020
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2019EDP7276
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E103-D
IS - 5
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - May 2020
AB - Biometric template protection techniques have been proposed to address security and privacy issues inherent to biometric-based authentication systems. However, it has been shown that the robustness of most of such techniques against reversibility and linkability attacks are overestimated. Thus, a thorough security analysis of recently proposed template protection schemes has to be carried out. Negative iris recognition is an interesting iris template protection scheme based on the concept of negative databases. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of this scheme in order to validate its practical usefulness. Although the authors of negative iris recognition claim that their scheme possesses both irreversibility and unlinkability, we demonstrate that more than 75% of the original iris-code bits can be recovered using a single protected template. Moreover, we show that the negative iris recognition scheme is vulnerable to attacks via record multiplicity where an adversary can combine several transformed templates to recover more proportion of the original iris-code. Finally, we demonstrate that the scheme does not possess unlinkability. The experimental results, on the CASIA-IrisV3 Interval public database, support our theory and confirm that the negative iris recognition scheme is susceptible to reversibility, linkability, and record multiplicity attacks.
ER -