IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Efficient Protection Mechanism for CPU Cache Flush Instruction Based Attacks
Summary :
CPU flush instruction-based cache side-channel attacks (cache instruction attacks) target a wide range of machines. For instance, Meltdown / Spectre combined with FLUSH+RELOAD gain read access to arbitrary data in operating system kernel and user processes, which work on cloud virtual machines, laptops, desktops, and mobile devices. Additionally, fault injection attacks use a CPU cache. For instance, Rowhammer, is a cache instruction attack that attempts to obtain write access to arbitrary data in physical memory, and affects machines that have DDR3. To protect against existing cache instruction attacks, various existing mechanisms have been proposed to modify hardware and software aspects; however, when latest cache instruction attacks are disclosed, these mechanisms cannot prevent these. Moreover, additional countermeasure requires long time for the designing and developing process. This paper proposes a novel mechanism termed FlushBlocker to protect against all types of cache instruction attacks and mitigate against cache instruction attacks employ latest side-channel vulnerability until the releasing of additional countermeasures. FlushBlocker employs an approach that restricts the issuing of cache flush instructions and the attacks that lead to failure by limiting control of the CPU cache. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this study, FlushBlocker was implemented in the latest Linux kernel, and its security and performance were evaluated. Results show that FlushBlocker successfully prevents existing cache instruction attacks (e.g., Meltdown, Spectre, and Rowhammer), the performance overhead was zero, and it was transparent in real-world applications.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E105-D No.11 pp.1890-1899
- Publication Date
- 2022/11/01
- Publicized
- 2022/07/19
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1361
- DOI
- 10.1587/transinf.2022NGP0008
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Next-generation Security Applications and Practice)
- Category
Authors
Shuhei ENOMOTO
Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology
Hiroki KUZUNO
Kobe University
Hiroshi YAMADA
Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Shuhei ENOMOTO, Hiroki KUZUNO, Hiroshi YAMADA, "Efficient Protection Mechanism for CPU Cache Flush Instruction Based Attacks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E105-D, no. 11, pp. 1890-1899, November 2022, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2022NGP0008.
Abstract: CPU flush instruction-based cache side-channel attacks (cache instruction attacks) target a wide range of machines. For instance, Meltdown / Spectre combined with FLUSH+RELOAD gain read access to arbitrary data in operating system kernel and user processes, which work on cloud virtual machines, laptops, desktops, and mobile devices. Additionally, fault injection attacks use a CPU cache. For instance, Rowhammer, is a cache instruction attack that attempts to obtain write access to arbitrary data in physical memory, and affects machines that have DDR3. To protect against existing cache instruction attacks, various existing mechanisms have been proposed to modify hardware and software aspects; however, when latest cache instruction attacks are disclosed, these mechanisms cannot prevent these. Moreover, additional countermeasure requires long time for the designing and developing process. This paper proposes a novel mechanism termed FlushBlocker to protect against all types of cache instruction attacks and mitigate against cache instruction attacks employ latest side-channel vulnerability until the releasing of additional countermeasures. FlushBlocker employs an approach that restricts the issuing of cache flush instructions and the attacks that lead to failure by limiting control of the CPU cache. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this study, FlushBlocker was implemented in the latest Linux kernel, and its security and performance were evaluated. Results show that FlushBlocker successfully prevents existing cache instruction attacks (e.g., Meltdown, Spectre, and Rowhammer), the performance overhead was zero, and it was transparent in real-world applications.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2022NGP0008/_p
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@ARTICLE{e105-d_11_1890,
author={Shuhei ENOMOTO, Hiroki KUZUNO, Hiroshi YAMADA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Efficient Protection Mechanism for CPU Cache Flush Instruction Based Attacks},
year={2022},
volume={E105-D},
number={11},
pages={1890-1899},
abstract={CPU flush instruction-based cache side-channel attacks (cache instruction attacks) target a wide range of machines. For instance, Meltdown / Spectre combined with FLUSH+RELOAD gain read access to arbitrary data in operating system kernel and user processes, which work on cloud virtual machines, laptops, desktops, and mobile devices. Additionally, fault injection attacks use a CPU cache. For instance, Rowhammer, is a cache instruction attack that attempts to obtain write access to arbitrary data in physical memory, and affects machines that have DDR3. To protect against existing cache instruction attacks, various existing mechanisms have been proposed to modify hardware and software aspects; however, when latest cache instruction attacks are disclosed, these mechanisms cannot prevent these. Moreover, additional countermeasure requires long time for the designing and developing process. This paper proposes a novel mechanism termed FlushBlocker to protect against all types of cache instruction attacks and mitigate against cache instruction attacks employ latest side-channel vulnerability until the releasing of additional countermeasures. FlushBlocker employs an approach that restricts the issuing of cache flush instructions and the attacks that lead to failure by limiting control of the CPU cache. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this study, FlushBlocker was implemented in the latest Linux kernel, and its security and performance were evaluated. Results show that FlushBlocker successfully prevents existing cache instruction attacks (e.g., Meltdown, Spectre, and Rowhammer), the performance overhead was zero, and it was transparent in real-world applications.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2022NGP0008},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={November},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Efficient Protection Mechanism for CPU Cache Flush Instruction Based Attacks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 1890
EP - 1899
AU - Shuhei ENOMOTO
AU - Hiroki KUZUNO
AU - Hiroshi YAMADA
PY - 2022
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2022NGP0008
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E105-D
IS - 11
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - November 2022
AB - CPU flush instruction-based cache side-channel attacks (cache instruction attacks) target a wide range of machines. For instance, Meltdown / Spectre combined with FLUSH+RELOAD gain read access to arbitrary data in operating system kernel and user processes, which work on cloud virtual machines, laptops, desktops, and mobile devices. Additionally, fault injection attacks use a CPU cache. For instance, Rowhammer, is a cache instruction attack that attempts to obtain write access to arbitrary data in physical memory, and affects machines that have DDR3. To protect against existing cache instruction attacks, various existing mechanisms have been proposed to modify hardware and software aspects; however, when latest cache instruction attacks are disclosed, these mechanisms cannot prevent these. Moreover, additional countermeasure requires long time for the designing and developing process. This paper proposes a novel mechanism termed FlushBlocker to protect against all types of cache instruction attacks and mitigate against cache instruction attacks employ latest side-channel vulnerability until the releasing of additional countermeasures. FlushBlocker employs an approach that restricts the issuing of cache flush instructions and the attacks that lead to failure by limiting control of the CPU cache. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this study, FlushBlocker was implemented in the latest Linux kernel, and its security and performance were evaluated. Results show that FlushBlocker successfully prevents existing cache instruction attacks (e.g., Meltdown, Spectre, and Rowhammer), the performance overhead was zero, and it was transparent in real-world applications.
ER -
English
