Consider a client who intends to perform a massive computing task comprsing a number of sub-tasks, while both storage and computation are outsourced by a third-party service provider. How could the client ensure the integrity and completeness of the computation result? Meanwhile, how could the assurance mechanism incur no disincentive, e.g., excessive communication cost, for any service provider or client to participate in such a scheme? We detail this problem and present a general model of execution assurance for massive computing tasks. A series of key features distinguish our work from existing ones: a) we consider the context wherein both storage and computation are provided by untrusted third parties, and client has no data possession; b) we propose a simple yet effective assurance model based on a novel integration of the machineries of data authentication and computational private information retrieval (cPIR); c) we conduct an analytical study on the inherent trade-offs among the verification accuracy, and the computation, storage, and communication costs.
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Ting WANG, Ling LIU, "Execution Assurance for Massive Computing Tasks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E93-D, no. 6, pp. 1343-1351, June 2010, doi: 10.1587/transinf.E93.D.1343.
Abstract: Consider a client who intends to perform a massive computing task comprsing a number of sub-tasks, while both storage and computation are outsourced by a third-party service provider. How could the client ensure the integrity and completeness of the computation result? Meanwhile, how could the assurance mechanism incur no disincentive, e.g., excessive communication cost, for any service provider or client to participate in such a scheme? We detail this problem and present a general model of execution assurance for massive computing tasks. A series of key features distinguish our work from existing ones: a) we consider the context wherein both storage and computation are provided by untrusted third parties, and client has no data possession; b) we propose a simple yet effective assurance model based on a novel integration of the machineries of data authentication and computational private information retrieval (cPIR); c) we conduct an analytical study on the inherent trade-offs among the verification accuracy, and the computation, storage, and communication costs.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.E93.D.1343/_p
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@ARTICLE{e93-d_6_1343,
author={Ting WANG, Ling LIU, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Execution Assurance for Massive Computing Tasks},
year={2010},
volume={E93-D},
number={6},
pages={1343-1351},
abstract={Consider a client who intends to perform a massive computing task comprsing a number of sub-tasks, while both storage and computation are outsourced by a third-party service provider. How could the client ensure the integrity and completeness of the computation result? Meanwhile, how could the assurance mechanism incur no disincentive, e.g., excessive communication cost, for any service provider or client to participate in such a scheme? We detail this problem and present a general model of execution assurance for massive computing tasks. A series of key features distinguish our work from existing ones: a) we consider the context wherein both storage and computation are provided by untrusted third parties, and client has no data possession; b) we propose a simple yet effective assurance model based on a novel integration of the machineries of data authentication and computational private information retrieval (cPIR); c) we conduct an analytical study on the inherent trade-offs among the verification accuracy, and the computation, storage, and communication costs.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.E93.D.1343},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={June},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Execution Assurance for Massive Computing Tasks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 1343
EP - 1351
AU - Ting WANG
AU - Ling LIU
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transinf.E93.D.1343
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E93-D
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - June 2010
AB - Consider a client who intends to perform a massive computing task comprsing a number of sub-tasks, while both storage and computation are outsourced by a third-party service provider. How could the client ensure the integrity and completeness of the computation result? Meanwhile, how could the assurance mechanism incur no disincentive, e.g., excessive communication cost, for any service provider or client to participate in such a scheme? We detail this problem and present a general model of execution assurance for massive computing tasks. A series of key features distinguish our work from existing ones: a) we consider the context wherein both storage and computation are provided by untrusted third parties, and client has no data possession; b) we propose a simple yet effective assurance model based on a novel integration of the machineries of data authentication and computational private information retrieval (cPIR); c) we conduct an analytical study on the inherent trade-offs among the verification accuracy, and the computation, storage, and communication costs.
ER -