On the Security of BioEncoding Based Cancelable Biometrics
Summary :
Proving the security of cancelable biometrics and other template protection techniques is a key prerequisite for the widespread deployment of biometric technologies. BioEncoding is a cancelable biometrics scheme that has been proposed recently to protect biometric templates represented as binary strings like iris codes. Unlike other template protection schemes, BioEncoding does not require user-specific keys or tokens. Moreover, it satisfies the requirements of untraceable biometrics without sacrificing the matching accuracy. However, the security of BioEncoding against smart attacks, such as correlation and optimization-based attacks, has to be proved before recommending it for practical deployment. In this paper, the security of BioEncopding, in terms of both non-invertibility and privacy protection, is analyzed. First, resistance of protected templates generated using BioEncoding against brute-force search attacks is revisited rigorously. Then, vulnerabilities of BioEncoding with respect to correlation attacks and optimization based attacks are identified and explained. Furthermore, an important modification to the BioEncoding algorithm is proposed to enhance its security against correlation attacks. The effect of integrating this modification into BioEncoding is validated and its impact on the matching accuracy is investigated empirically using CASIA-IrisV3-Interval dataset. Experimental results confirm the efficacy of the proposed modification and show that it has no negative impact on the matching accuracy.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E94-D No.9 pp.1768-1777
- Publication Date
- 2011/09/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1361
- DOI
- 10.1587/transinf.E94.D.1768
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Information Network
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Osama OUDA, Norimichi TSUMURA, Toshiya NAKAGUCHI, "On the Security of BioEncoding Based Cancelable Biometrics" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E94-D, no. 9, pp. 1768-1777, September 2011, doi: 10.1587/transinf.E94.D.1768.
Abstract: Proving the security of cancelable biometrics and other template protection techniques is a key prerequisite for the widespread deployment of biometric technologies. BioEncoding is a cancelable biometrics scheme that has been proposed recently to protect biometric templates represented as binary strings like iris codes. Unlike other template protection schemes, BioEncoding does not require user-specific keys or tokens. Moreover, it satisfies the requirements of untraceable biometrics without sacrificing the matching accuracy. However, the security of BioEncoding against smart attacks, such as correlation and optimization-based attacks, has to be proved before recommending it for practical deployment. In this paper, the security of BioEncopding, in terms of both non-invertibility and privacy protection, is analyzed. First, resistance of protected templates generated using BioEncoding against brute-force search attacks is revisited rigorously. Then, vulnerabilities of BioEncoding with respect to correlation attacks and optimization based attacks are identified and explained. Furthermore, an important modification to the BioEncoding algorithm is proposed to enhance its security against correlation attacks. The effect of integrating this modification into BioEncoding is validated and its impact on the matching accuracy is investigated empirically using CASIA-IrisV3-Interval dataset. Experimental results confirm the efficacy of the proposed modification and show that it has no negative impact on the matching accuracy.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.E94.D.1768/_p
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@ARTICLE{e94-d_9_1768,
author={Osama OUDA, Norimichi TSUMURA, Toshiya NAKAGUCHI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={On the Security of BioEncoding Based Cancelable Biometrics},
year={2011},
volume={E94-D},
number={9},
pages={1768-1777},
abstract={Proving the security of cancelable biometrics and other template protection techniques is a key prerequisite for the widespread deployment of biometric technologies. BioEncoding is a cancelable biometrics scheme that has been proposed recently to protect biometric templates represented as binary strings like iris codes. Unlike other template protection schemes, BioEncoding does not require user-specific keys or tokens. Moreover, it satisfies the requirements of untraceable biometrics without sacrificing the matching accuracy. However, the security of BioEncoding against smart attacks, such as correlation and optimization-based attacks, has to be proved before recommending it for practical deployment. In this paper, the security of BioEncopding, in terms of both non-invertibility and privacy protection, is analyzed. First, resistance of protected templates generated using BioEncoding against brute-force search attacks is revisited rigorously. Then, vulnerabilities of BioEncoding with respect to correlation attacks and optimization based attacks are identified and explained. Furthermore, an important modification to the BioEncoding algorithm is proposed to enhance its security against correlation attacks. The effect of integrating this modification into BioEncoding is validated and its impact on the matching accuracy is investigated empirically using CASIA-IrisV3-Interval dataset. Experimental results confirm the efficacy of the proposed modification and show that it has no negative impact on the matching accuracy.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.E94.D.1768},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={September},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - On the Security of BioEncoding Based Cancelable Biometrics
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 1768
EP - 1777
AU - Osama OUDA
AU - Norimichi TSUMURA
AU - Toshiya NAKAGUCHI
PY - 2011
DO - 10.1587/transinf.E94.D.1768
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E94-D
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - September 2011
AB - Proving the security of cancelable biometrics and other template protection techniques is a key prerequisite for the widespread deployment of biometric technologies. BioEncoding is a cancelable biometrics scheme that has been proposed recently to protect biometric templates represented as binary strings like iris codes. Unlike other template protection schemes, BioEncoding does not require user-specific keys or tokens. Moreover, it satisfies the requirements of untraceable biometrics without sacrificing the matching accuracy. However, the security of BioEncoding against smart attacks, such as correlation and optimization-based attacks, has to be proved before recommending it for practical deployment. In this paper, the security of BioEncopding, in terms of both non-invertibility and privacy protection, is analyzed. First, resistance of protected templates generated using BioEncoding against brute-force search attacks is revisited rigorously. Then, vulnerabilities of BioEncoding with respect to correlation attacks and optimization based attacks are identified and explained. Furthermore, an important modification to the BioEncoding algorithm is proposed to enhance its security against correlation attacks. The effect of integrating this modification into BioEncoding is validated and its impact on the matching accuracy is investigated empirically using CASIA-IrisV3-Interval dataset. Experimental results confirm the efficacy of the proposed modification and show that it has no negative impact on the matching accuracy.
ER -
English
