IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
An Auction Based Distribute Mechanism for P2P Adaptive Bandwidth Allocation
Summary :
In P2P applications, networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, routing hotspots or routing congestions are typically created by an unanticipated new event that triggers an unanticipated surge of users to request streaming service from some particular nodes; and a challenging problem is how to provide incentive mechanisms to allocation bandwidth more fairly in order to avoid congestion and other short backs for P2P QoS. In this paper, we study P2P bandwidth game — the bandwidth allocation in P2P networks. Unlike previous works which focus either on routing or on forwarding, this paper investigates the game theoretic mechanism to incentivize node's real bandwidth demands and propose novel method that avoid congestion proactively, that is, prior to a congestion event. More specifically, we define an incentive-compatible pricing vector explicitly and give theoretical proofs to demonstrate that our mechanism can provide incentives for nodes to tell the true bandwidth demand. In order to apply this mechanism to the P2P distribution applications, we evaluate our mechanism by NS-2 simulations. The simulation results show that the incentive pricing mechanism can distribute the bandwidth fairly and effectively and can also avoid the routing hotspot and congestion effectively.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E96-D No.12 pp.2704-2712
- Publication Date
- 2013/12/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1361
- DOI
- 10.1587/transinf.E96.D.2704
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Parallel and Distributed Computing and Networking)
- Category
Authors
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Fang ZUO, Wei ZHANG, "An Auction Based Distribute Mechanism for P2P Adaptive Bandwidth Allocation" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E96-D, no. 12, pp. 2704-2712, December 2013, doi: 10.1587/transinf.E96.D.2704.
Abstract: In P2P applications, networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, routing hotspots or routing congestions are typically created by an unanticipated new event that triggers an unanticipated surge of users to request streaming service from some particular nodes; and a challenging problem is how to provide incentive mechanisms to allocation bandwidth more fairly in order to avoid congestion and other short backs for P2P QoS. In this paper, we study P2P bandwidth game — the bandwidth allocation in P2P networks. Unlike previous works which focus either on routing or on forwarding, this paper investigates the game theoretic mechanism to incentivize node's real bandwidth demands and propose novel method that avoid congestion proactively, that is, prior to a congestion event. More specifically, we define an incentive-compatible pricing vector explicitly and give theoretical proofs to demonstrate that our mechanism can provide incentives for nodes to tell the true bandwidth demand. In order to apply this mechanism to the P2P distribution applications, we evaluate our mechanism by NS-2 simulations. The simulation results show that the incentive pricing mechanism can distribute the bandwidth fairly and effectively and can also avoid the routing hotspot and congestion effectively.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.E96.D.2704/_p
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@ARTICLE{e96-d_12_2704,
author={Fang ZUO, Wei ZHANG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={An Auction Based Distribute Mechanism for P2P Adaptive Bandwidth Allocation},
year={2013},
volume={E96-D},
number={12},
pages={2704-2712},
abstract={In P2P applications, networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, routing hotspots or routing congestions are typically created by an unanticipated new event that triggers an unanticipated surge of users to request streaming service from some particular nodes; and a challenging problem is how to provide incentive mechanisms to allocation bandwidth more fairly in order to avoid congestion and other short backs for P2P QoS. In this paper, we study P2P bandwidth game — the bandwidth allocation in P2P networks. Unlike previous works which focus either on routing or on forwarding, this paper investigates the game theoretic mechanism to incentivize node's real bandwidth demands and propose novel method that avoid congestion proactively, that is, prior to a congestion event. More specifically, we define an incentive-compatible pricing vector explicitly and give theoretical proofs to demonstrate that our mechanism can provide incentives for nodes to tell the true bandwidth demand. In order to apply this mechanism to the P2P distribution applications, we evaluate our mechanism by NS-2 simulations. The simulation results show that the incentive pricing mechanism can distribute the bandwidth fairly and effectively and can also avoid the routing hotspot and congestion effectively.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.E96.D.2704},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={December},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - An Auction Based Distribute Mechanism for P2P Adaptive Bandwidth Allocation
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 2704
EP - 2712
AU - Fang ZUO
AU - Wei ZHANG
PY - 2013
DO - 10.1587/transinf.E96.D.2704
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E96-D
IS - 12
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - December 2013
AB - In P2P applications, networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, routing hotspots or routing congestions are typically created by an unanticipated new event that triggers an unanticipated surge of users to request streaming service from some particular nodes; and a challenging problem is how to provide incentive mechanisms to allocation bandwidth more fairly in order to avoid congestion and other short backs for P2P QoS. In this paper, we study P2P bandwidth game — the bandwidth allocation in P2P networks. Unlike previous works which focus either on routing or on forwarding, this paper investigates the game theoretic mechanism to incentivize node's real bandwidth demands and propose novel method that avoid congestion proactively, that is, prior to a congestion event. More specifically, we define an incentive-compatible pricing vector explicitly and give theoretical proofs to demonstrate that our mechanism can provide incentives for nodes to tell the true bandwidth demand. In order to apply this mechanism to the P2P distribution applications, we evaluate our mechanism by NS-2 simulations. The simulation results show that the incentive pricing mechanism can distribute the bandwidth fairly and effectively and can also avoid the routing hotspot and congestion effectively.
ER -
English
