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Jin HOKI Kosei SAKAMOTO Kazuhiko MINEMATSU Takanori ISOBE
In this paper, we explore the security against integral attacks on well-known stream ciphers SNOW 3G and KCipher-2. SNOW 3G is the core of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms UEA2 and UIA2, and KCipher-2 is a standard algorithm of ISO/IEC 18033-4 and CRYPTREC. Specifically, we investigate the propagation of the division property inside SNOW 3G and KCipher-2 by the Mixed-Integer Linear Programming to efficiently find an integral distinguisher. As a result, we present a 7-round integral distinguisher with 23 chosen IVs for KCipher-2. As far as we know, this is the first attack on a reduced variant of KCipher-2 by the third party. In addition, we present a 13-round integral distinguisher with 27 chosen IVs for SNOW 3G, whose time/data complexity is half of the previous best attack by Biryukov et al.
Kazuhiko MINEMATSU Toshiyasu MATSUSHIMA
This paper presents MACs that combine a block cipher and its component such as a reduced-round version. Our MACs are faster than the standard MAC modes such as CBC-MAC, and provably secure if the block cipher is pseudorandom and its component is a permutation with a small differential probability. Such a MAC scheme was recently proposed by one of authors, and we provide improvements about security and treading-off between speed and amount of preprocessing.
Kazuhiko MINEMATSU Toshiyasu MATSUSHIMA
This paper describes an extension of XEX* mode, which is a method to convert a block cipher into a tagged tweakable block cipher, a notion introduced by Rogaway in 2004 as an extension of the tweakable block cipher by Liskov et al. Our extension attaches an additional encryption function to the original XEX*, which has some limitation but is slightly faster than the encryption implemented by XEX*. We prove our scheme's security in a general form, where the offset function, a key component of our construction, is not restricted to the one used by XEX*. We also provide some applications of our result, in particular to OCB 2.0, an authenticated encryption based on XEX*.
Jin HOKI Kosei SAKAMOTO Fukang LIU Kazuhiko MINEMATSU Takanori ISOBE
This paper investigates the security of KCipher-2 against differential attacks. We utilize an MILP-based method to evaluate the minimum number of active S-boxes in each round. We try to construct an accurate model to describe the 8-bit truncated difference propagation through the modular addition operation and the linear transformation of KCipher-2, respectively, which were omitted or simplified in the previous evaluation by Preneel et al. In our constructed model, the difference characteristics neglected in Preneel et al.'s evaluation can be taken into account and all valid differential characteristics can be covered. As a result, we reveal that the minimal number of active S-boxes is 25 over 15 rounds in the related IV setting and it is 17 over 24 rounds in the related IV-key setting. Therefore, this paper shows for the first time that KCipher-2 is secure against the related IV differential attack.
Kosei SAKAMOTO Kazuhiko MINEMATSU Nao SHIBATA Maki SHIGERI Hiroyasu KUBO Yuki FUNABIKI Takanori ISOBE
In this paper, we revisit related-key security of TWINE block cipher with 80-bit and 128-bit keys. Using an MILP-aided automatic search algorithm, we point out the previous evaluation of TWINE with a 80-bit key is wrong, and give a corrected evaluation result. Besides, we show a first security evaluation of TWINE with a 128-bit key in the related-key setting, which was infeasible due to the high computation cost in the original proposal.
Takanori ISOBE Kazuhiko MINEMATSU
In this paper, we analyze the security of an end-to-end encryption scheme (E2EE) of LINE, a.k.a Letter Sealing. LINE is one of the most widely-deployed instant messaging applications, especially in East Asia. By a close inspection of their protocols, we give several attacks against the message integrity of Letter Sealing. Specifically, we propose forgery and impersonation attacks on the one-to-one message encryption and the group message encryption. All of our attacks are feasible with the help of an end-to-end adversary, who has access to the inside of the LINE server (e.g. service provider LINE themselves). We stress that the main purpose of E2EE is to provide a protection against the end-to-end adversary. In addition, we found some attacks that even do not need the help of E2E adversary, which shows a critical security flaw of the protocol. Our results reveal that the E2EE scheme of LINE do not sufficiently guarantee the integrity of messages compared to the state-of-the-art E2EE schemes such as Signal, which is used by WhatApp and Facebook Messenger. We also provide some countermeasures against our attacks. We have shared our findings with LINE corporation in advance. The LINE corporation has confirmed our attacks are valid as long as the E2E adversary is involved, and officially recognizes our results as a vulnerability of encryption break.
Kosei SAKAMOTO Kazuhiko MINEMATSU Nao SHIBATA Maki SHIGERI Hiroyasu KUBO Takanori ISOBE
In spite of the research for a linear layer of Type-2 Generalized Feistel Network (Type-2 GFN) over more than 10 years, finding a good 32-branch permutation for Type-2 GFN is still a very hard task due to a huge search space. In terms of the diffusion property, Suzaki and Minematsu investigated the required number of rounds to achieve the full diffusion when the branch number is up to 16. After that, Derbez et al. presented a class of 32-branch permutations that achieves the 9-round full diffusion and they prove that this is optimal. However, this class is not suitable to be used in Type-2 GFN because it requires a large number of rounds to ensure a sufficient number of active S-boxes. In this paper, we present how to find a good class of 32-branch permutations for Type-2 GFN. To achieve this goal, we convert Type-2 GFN into a LBlock-like structure, and then we evaluate the diffusion property and the resistance against major attacks, such as differential, linear, impossible differential and integral attacks by an MILP. As a result, we present a good class of 32-branch permutations that achieves the 10-round full diffusion, ensures differentially/linearly active S-boxes of 66 at 19 round, and has the 18/20-round impossible differential/integral distinguisher, respectively. The 32-branch permutation used in WARP was chosen among this class.
Kosei SAKAMOTO Kazuhiko MINEMATSU Nao SHIBATA Maki SHIGERI Hiroyasu KUBO Yuki FUNABIKI Andrey BOGDANOV Sumio MORIOKA Takanori ISOBE
Tweakable block cipher (TBC) is an extension of conventional block cipher. We study how to build a TBC based on generalized Feistel structure (GFS), a classical block cipher construction. While known dedicated TBC proposals are based on substitution-permutation network (SPN), GFS has not been used for building TBC. In particular, we take 64-bit GFS block cipher TWINE and try to make it tweakable with a minimum change. To find a best one from a large number of candidates, we performed a comprehensive search with a help of mixed integer linear programming (MILP) solver. As a result, our proposal TWINE is quite efficient, has the same number of rounds as TWINE with extremely simple tweak schedule.
Hayato KOBAYASHI Kazuhiko MINEMATSU Tetsu IWATA
An Authenticated Encryption scheme is used to guarantee both privacy and authenticity of digital data. At FSE 2014, an authenticated encryption scheme called CLOC was proposed. CLOC is designed to handle short input data efficiently without needing heavy precomputation nor large memory. This is achieved by making various cases of different treatments in the encryption process depending on the input data. Five tweak functions are used to handle the conditional branches, and they are designed to satisfy 55 differential probability constraints, which are used in the security proof of CLOC. In this paper, we show that all these 55 constraints are necessary. This shows the design optimality of the tweak functions in CLOC in that the constraints cannot be relaxed, and hence the specification of the tweak functions cannot be simplified.