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Rong HU Kirill MOROZOV Tsuyoshi TAKAGI
Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKE's, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto'93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt'12.
Rui XU Kirill MOROZOV Tsuyoshi TAKAGI
Harn and Lin proposed an algorithm to detect and identify cheaters in Shamir's secret sharing scheme in the journal Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 2009. In particular, their algorithm for cheater identification is inefficient. We point out that some of their conditions for cheater detection and identification essentially follow from those on error detection/correction of Reed-Solomon codes, which have efficient decoding algorithms, while some other presented conditions turn out to be incorrect. The extended and improved version of the above mentioned scheme was recently presented at the conference International Computer Symposium 2012 (and the journal version appeared in the journal IET Information Security). The new scheme, which is ideal (i.e. the share size is equal to that of the secret), attempts to identify cheaters from minimal number of shares (i.e. the threshold of them). We show that the proposed cheater identification is impossible using the arguments from coding theory.
Rui XU Kirill MOROZOV Tsuyoshi TAKAGI
We introduce two cheater identifiable secret sharing (CISS) schemes with efficient reconstruction, tolerating t