IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Zero-Knowledge Protocols for Code-Based Public-Key Encryption
Summary :
Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKE's, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto'93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt'12.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E98-A No.10 pp.2139-2151
- Publication Date
- 2015/10/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Cryptography and Information Security
Authors
Rong HU
Kyushu University
Kirill MOROZOV
Kyushu University
Tsuyoshi TAKAGI
Kyushu University
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Rong HU, Kirill MOROZOV, Tsuyoshi TAKAGI, "Zero-Knowledge Protocols for Code-Based Public-Key Encryption" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E98-A, no. 10, pp. 2139-2151, October 2015, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139.
Abstract: Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKE's, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto'93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt'12.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139/_p
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@ARTICLE{e98-a_10_2139,
author={Rong HU, Kirill MOROZOV, Tsuyoshi TAKAGI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Zero-Knowledge Protocols for Code-Based Public-Key Encryption},
year={2015},
volume={E98-A},
number={10},
pages={2139-2151},
abstract={Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKE's, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto'93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt'12.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={October},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Zero-Knowledge Protocols for Code-Based Public-Key Encryption
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2139
EP - 2151
AU - Rong HU
AU - Kirill MOROZOV
AU - Tsuyoshi TAKAGI
PY - 2015
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E98-A
IS - 10
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - October 2015
AB - Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKE's, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto'93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt'12.
ER -
English
