To achieve highly efficient spectrum usage, dynamic sharing of scarce spectrum resources has recently become the subject of intense discussion. The technologies of dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS) have already been adopted or are scheduled to be adopted in a number of countries, and Japan is no exception. The authors and organizations collaborating in the research and development project being undertaken in Japan have studied a novel DSS system positioned between the fifth-generation mobile communication system (5G system) and different incumbent radio systems. Our DSS system has three characteristics. (1) It detects dynamically unused sharable spectrums (USSs) of incumbent radio systems for the space axis by using novel propagation models and estimation of the transmitting location with radio sensor information. (2) It manages USSs for the time axis by interference calculation with propagation parameters, fair assignment and future usage of USSs. (3) It utilizes USSs for the spectrum axis by using methods that decrease interference for lower separation distances. In this paper, we present an overview and the technologies of our DSS system and its applications in Japan.

The traditional spectrum auctions require a central auctioneer. Then, the secondary users (SUs) can bid for spectrum in multiple auction or sealed auction way. In this paper, we address the problem of distributed spectrum sharing in the cognitive networks where multiple owners sell their spare bands to multiple SUs. Each SU equips multi-interface/multi-radio, so that SU can buy spare bands from multiple owners. On the other hand, each owner can sell its spare bands to serval SUs. There are two questions to be addressed for such an environment: the first one is how to select bands/the owners for each SU; the second one is how to decide the competitive prices for the multiple owners and multiple SUs. To this end, we propose a two-side multi-band market game theoretic framework to jointly consider the benefits of all SUs and owners. The equilibrium concept in such games is named core. The outcomes in the core of the game cannot be improved upon by any subset of players. These outcomes correspond exactly to the price-lists that competitively balance the benefits of all SUs and owners. We show that the core in our model is always non-empty. When the measurement of price takes discrete value, the core of the game is defined as discrete core. The Dynamic Multi-band Sharing algorithm (DMS) is proposed to converge to the discrete core of the game. With small enough measurement unit of price, the algorithm can achieve the optimal performance compared with centralized one in terms of the system utility.