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Sunwoo JANG Young-Kyoon SUH Byungchul TAK
This letter presents a technique that observes system call mapping behavior of the proxy kernel layer of secure container runtimes. We applied it to file system operations of a secure container runtime, gVisor. We found that gVisor's operations can become more expensive than the native by 48× more syscalls for open, and 6× for read and write.
Yuki KAJIWARA Junjun ZHENG Koichi MOURI
The number of malware, including variants and new types, is dramatically increasing over the years, posing one of the greatest cybersecurity threats nowadays. To counteract such security threats, it is crucial to detect malware accurately and early enough. The recent advances in machine learning technology have brought increasing interest in malware detection. A number of research studies have been conducted in the field. It is well known that malware detection accuracy largely depends on the training dataset used. Creating a suitable training dataset for efficient malware detection is thus crucial. Different works usually use their own dataset; therefore, a dataset is only effective for one detection method, and strictly comparing several methods using a common training dataset is difficult. In this paper, we focus on how to create a training dataset for efficiently detecting malware. To achieve our goal, the first step is to clarify the information that can accurately characterize malware. This paper concentrates on threads, by treating them as important information for characterizing malware. Specifically, on the basis of the dynamic analysis log from the Alkanet, a system call tracer, we obtain the thread information and classify the thread information processing into four patterns. Then the malware detection is performed using the number of transitions of system calls appearing in the thread as a feature. Our comparative experimental results showed that the primary thread information is important and useful for detecting malware with high accuracy.
Yingxu LAI Wenwen ZHANG Zhen YANG
Current software behavior models lack the ability to conduct semantic analysis. We propose a new model to detect abnormal behaviors based on a function semantic tree. First, a software behavior model in terms of state graph and software function is developed. Next, anomaly detection based on the model is conducted in two main steps: calculating deviation density of suspicious behaviors by comparison with state graph and detecting function sequence by function semantic rules. Deviation density can well detect control flow attacks by a deviation factor and a period division. In addition, with the help of semantic analysis, function semantic rules can accurately detect application layer attacks that fail in traditional approaches. Finally, a case study of RSS software illustrates how our approach works. Case study and a contrast experiment have shown that our model has strong expressivity and detection ability, which outperforms traditional behavior models.
Yingxu LAI Wenwen ZHANG Zhen YANG
In this paper, we propose a new trusted modeling approach based on state graphs. We introduce a novel method of deriving state-layer from a system call sequence in terms of probability and statistics theory, and we identify the state sequence with the help of Hidden Markov Model (HMM). We generate state transition graph according to software executing process and pruning rules. Then, we separate local function graphs according to software specific functions by semantic analysis. The state-layer is a bridge between the basic behaviors and the upper layer functions of software to compensate semantic faults. In addition, a pruning strategy of formulating state graphs is designed to precisely describe each piece of software functions. Finally, a detecting system based on our model is proposed, and a case study of RSS software reveals how our system works. The results demonstrate that our trusted model describes software behaviors successfully and can well detect un-trust behaviors, anomaly behaviors, and illegal input behaviors.
Takahiro HARUYAMA Hidenori NAKAZATO Hideyoshi TOMINAGA
Existing anomaly intrusion detection that monitors system calls has two problems: vast false positives and lack of risk information on detection. In order to solve the two problems, we propose an intrusion detection method called "Callchains." Callchains reduces the false positives of existing anomaly intrusion detection by restricting monitoring to the activities with process capabilities prescribed by POSIX 1003.1e. Additionally, Callchains provides an administrator information of used POSIX capabilities in sytem call execution as an indicator of risk. This paper shows Callchains' design, its implementation, and experimental results comparing Callchains with existing approaches.
Midori ASAKA Takefumi ONABUTA Tadashi INOUE Shunji OKAZAWA Shigeki GOTO
Many methods have been proposed to detect intrusions; for example, the pattern matching method on known intrusion patterns and the statistical approach to detecting deviation from normal activities. We investigated a new method for detecting intrusions based on the number of system calls during a user's network activity on a host machine. This method attempts to separate intrusions from normal activities by using discriminant analysis, a kind of multivariate analysis. We can detect intrusions by analyzing only 11 system calls occurring on a host machine by discriminant analysis with the Mahalanobis' distance, and can also tell whether an unknown sample is an intrusion. Our approach is a lightweight intrusion detection method, given that it requires only 11 system calls for analysis. Moreover, our approach does not require user profiles or a user activity database in order to detect intrusions. This paper explains our new method for the separation of intrusions and normal behavior by discriminant analysis, and describes the classification method by which to identify an unknown behavior.