IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
A Self-Confirming Engine for Preventing Man-in-the-Middle Attack
Summary :
In this paper, we focus on how to correct address mapping violation, in which an attacker rewrites the address mapping table of a victim to perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. We propose a technique for preventing MITM attacks in which a malicious user intercepts and possibly alters the data transmitted between two hosts. MITM attack is hard for legitimate users to notice during their normal communication, because each user believes they are communicating directly. Address mapping violation can occur because of vulnerability of address resolution protocols, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) in IPv4 and Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol in IPv6. Accordingly, a good method to prevent MITM attack by address mapping violation is essential for both current and future communications, i.e. wireless networks with roaming users and an interconnected world. Hence, our proposal mainly aims to have high usability in future applications such as embedded devices.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E87-B No.3 pp.530-538
- Publication Date
- 2004/03/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- DOI
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Internet Technology IV)
- Category
- Security
Authors
Keyword
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Masataka KANAMORI, Takashi KOBAYASHI, Suguru YAMAGUCHI, "A Self-Confirming Engine for Preventing Man-in-the-Middle Attack" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E87-B, no. 3, pp. 530-538, March 2004, doi: .
Abstract: In this paper, we focus on how to correct address mapping violation, in which an attacker rewrites the address mapping table of a victim to perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. We propose a technique for preventing MITM attacks in which a malicious user intercepts and possibly alters the data transmitted between two hosts. MITM attack is hard for legitimate users to notice during their normal communication, because each user believes they are communicating directly. Address mapping violation can occur because of vulnerability of address resolution protocols, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) in IPv4 and Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol in IPv6. Accordingly, a good method to prevent MITM attack by address mapping violation is essential for both current and future communications, i.e. wireless networks with roaming users and an interconnected world. Hence, our proposal mainly aims to have high usability in future applications such as embedded devices.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/e87-b_3_530/_p
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@ARTICLE{e87-b_3_530,
author={Masataka KANAMORI, Takashi KOBAYASHI, Suguru YAMAGUCHI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={A Self-Confirming Engine for Preventing Man-in-the-Middle Attack},
year={2004},
volume={E87-B},
number={3},
pages={530-538},
abstract={In this paper, we focus on how to correct address mapping violation, in which an attacker rewrites the address mapping table of a victim to perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. We propose a technique for preventing MITM attacks in which a malicious user intercepts and possibly alters the data transmitted between two hosts. MITM attack is hard for legitimate users to notice during their normal communication, because each user believes they are communicating directly. Address mapping violation can occur because of vulnerability of address resolution protocols, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) in IPv4 and Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol in IPv6. Accordingly, a good method to prevent MITM attack by address mapping violation is essential for both current and future communications, i.e. wireless networks with roaming users and an interconnected world. Hence, our proposal mainly aims to have high usability in future applications such as embedded devices.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={March},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - A Self-Confirming Engine for Preventing Man-in-the-Middle Attack
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 530
EP - 538
AU - Masataka KANAMORI
AU - Takashi KOBAYASHI
AU - Suguru YAMAGUCHI
PY - 2004
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN -
VL - E87-B
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - March 2004
AB - In this paper, we focus on how to correct address mapping violation, in which an attacker rewrites the address mapping table of a victim to perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. We propose a technique for preventing MITM attacks in which a malicious user intercepts and possibly alters the data transmitted between two hosts. MITM attack is hard for legitimate users to notice during their normal communication, because each user believes they are communicating directly. Address mapping violation can occur because of vulnerability of address resolution protocols, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) in IPv4 and Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol in IPv6. Accordingly, a good method to prevent MITM attack by address mapping violation is essential for both current and future communications, i.e. wireless networks with roaming users and an interconnected world. Hence, our proposal mainly aims to have high usability in future applications such as embedded devices.
ER -
English
