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Currently, mobile terminals face serious security threats. A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) which can provide an isolated execution environment for sensitive workloads, is seen as a trusted relay for providing security services for any mobile application. However, mobile TEE's architecture design and implementation strategy are not unbreakable at present. The existing researches lack of detect mechanisms for attack behaviour and malicious software. This paper proposes a Malicious code Detection scheme for Trusted Execution Environment based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE-TEEMD), which is a novel detection mechanism for data and code in the trusted execution environment. HE-TEEMD uses the Paillier additive homomorphic algorithm to implement the signature matching and transmits the ciphertext information generated in the TEE to the normal world for detection by the homomorphism and randomness of the homomorphic encryption ciphertext. An experiment and security analysis proves that our scheme can achieve malicious code detection in the secure world with minimal cost. Furthermore, evaluation parameters are introduced to address the known plaintext attack problem of privileged users.
Ziwang WANG
Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Yi ZHUANG
Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Ziwang WANG, Yi ZHUANG, "Malicious Code Detection for Trusted Execution Environment Based on Paillier Homomorphic Encryption" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E103-B, no. 3, pp. 155-166, March 2020, doi: 10.1587/transcom.2019EBP3098.
Abstract: Currently, mobile terminals face serious security threats. A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) which can provide an isolated execution environment for sensitive workloads, is seen as a trusted relay for providing security services for any mobile application. However, mobile TEE's architecture design and implementation strategy are not unbreakable at present. The existing researches lack of detect mechanisms for attack behaviour and malicious software. This paper proposes a Malicious code Detection scheme for Trusted Execution Environment based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE-TEEMD), which is a novel detection mechanism for data and code in the trusted execution environment. HE-TEEMD uses the Paillier additive homomorphic algorithm to implement the signature matching and transmits the ciphertext information generated in the TEE to the normal world for detection by the homomorphism and randomness of the homomorphic encryption ciphertext. An experiment and security analysis proves that our scheme can achieve malicious code detection in the secure world with minimal cost. Furthermore, evaluation parameters are introduced to address the known plaintext attack problem of privileged users.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.2019EBP3098/_p
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@ARTICLE{e103-b_3_155,
author={Ziwang WANG, Yi ZHUANG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Malicious Code Detection for Trusted Execution Environment Based on Paillier Homomorphic Encryption},
year={2020},
volume={E103-B},
number={3},
pages={155-166},
abstract={Currently, mobile terminals face serious security threats. A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) which can provide an isolated execution environment for sensitive workloads, is seen as a trusted relay for providing security services for any mobile application. However, mobile TEE's architecture design and implementation strategy are not unbreakable at present. The existing researches lack of detect mechanisms for attack behaviour and malicious software. This paper proposes a Malicious code Detection scheme for Trusted Execution Environment based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE-TEEMD), which is a novel detection mechanism for data and code in the trusted execution environment. HE-TEEMD uses the Paillier additive homomorphic algorithm to implement the signature matching and transmits the ciphertext information generated in the TEE to the normal world for detection by the homomorphism and randomness of the homomorphic encryption ciphertext. An experiment and security analysis proves that our scheme can achieve malicious code detection in the secure world with minimal cost. Furthermore, evaluation parameters are introduced to address the known plaintext attack problem of privileged users.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.2019EBP3098},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={March},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Malicious Code Detection for Trusted Execution Environment Based on Paillier Homomorphic Encryption
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 155
EP - 166
AU - Ziwang WANG
AU - Yi ZHUANG
PY - 2020
DO - 10.1587/transcom.2019EBP3098
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E103-B
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - March 2020
AB - Currently, mobile terminals face serious security threats. A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) which can provide an isolated execution environment for sensitive workloads, is seen as a trusted relay for providing security services for any mobile application. However, mobile TEE's architecture design and implementation strategy are not unbreakable at present. The existing researches lack of detect mechanisms for attack behaviour and malicious software. This paper proposes a Malicious code Detection scheme for Trusted Execution Environment based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE-TEEMD), which is a novel detection mechanism for data and code in the trusted execution environment. HE-TEEMD uses the Paillier additive homomorphic algorithm to implement the signature matching and transmits the ciphertext information generated in the TEE to the normal world for detection by the homomorphism and randomness of the homomorphic encryption ciphertext. An experiment and security analysis proves that our scheme can achieve malicious code detection in the secure world with minimal cost. Furthermore, evaluation parameters are introduced to address the known plaintext attack problem of privileged users.
ER -