IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Facilitating Incentive-Compatible Access Probability Selection in Wireless Random Access Networks
Summary :
This paper studies the impact of integrating pricing with connection admission control (CAC) on the congestion management practices in contention-based wireless random access networks. Notably, when the network is free of charge, each self-interested user tries to occupy the channel as much as possible, resulting in the inefficient utilization of network resources. Pricing is therefore adopted as incentive mechanism to encourage users to choose their access probabilities considering the real-time network congestion level. A Stackelberg leader-follower game is formulated to analyze the competitive interaction between the service provider and the users. In particular, each user chooses the access probability that optimizes its payoff, while the self-interested service provider decides whether to admit or to reject the user's connection request in order to optimize its revenue. The stability of the Stackelberg leader-follower game in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is established. The proposed CAC scheme is completely distributed and can be implemented by individual access points using only local information. Compared to the existing schemes, the proposed scheme achieves higher revenue gain, higher user payoff, and higher QoS performance.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E98-B No.11 pp.2280-2290
- Publication Date
- 2015/11/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1345
- DOI
- 10.1587/transcom.E98.B.2280
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Network
Authors
Bo GU
Waseda University,North China Electric Power University
Cheng ZHANG
Waseda University
Kyoko YAMORI
Asahi University,Waseda University
Zhenyu ZHOU
North China Electric Power University
Song LIU
North China Electric Power University
Yoshiaki TANAKA
Waseda University
Keyword
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Bo GU, Cheng ZHANG, Kyoko YAMORI, Zhenyu ZHOU, Song LIU, Yoshiaki TANAKA, "Facilitating Incentive-Compatible Access Probability Selection in Wireless Random Access Networks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E98-B, no. 11, pp. 2280-2290, November 2015, doi: 10.1587/transcom.E98.B.2280.
Abstract: This paper studies the impact of integrating pricing with connection admission control (CAC) on the congestion management practices in contention-based wireless random access networks. Notably, when the network is free of charge, each self-interested user tries to occupy the channel as much as possible, resulting in the inefficient utilization of network resources. Pricing is therefore adopted as incentive mechanism to encourage users to choose their access probabilities considering the real-time network congestion level. A Stackelberg leader-follower game is formulated to analyze the competitive interaction between the service provider and the users. In particular, each user chooses the access probability that optimizes its payoff, while the self-interested service provider decides whether to admit or to reject the user's connection request in order to optimize its revenue. The stability of the Stackelberg leader-follower game in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is established. The proposed CAC scheme is completely distributed and can be implemented by individual access points using only local information. Compared to the existing schemes, the proposed scheme achieves higher revenue gain, higher user payoff, and higher QoS performance.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.E98.B.2280/_p
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@ARTICLE{e98-b_11_2280,
author={Bo GU, Cheng ZHANG, Kyoko YAMORI, Zhenyu ZHOU, Song LIU, Yoshiaki TANAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Facilitating Incentive-Compatible Access Probability Selection in Wireless Random Access Networks},
year={2015},
volume={E98-B},
number={11},
pages={2280-2290},
abstract={This paper studies the impact of integrating pricing with connection admission control (CAC) on the congestion management practices in contention-based wireless random access networks. Notably, when the network is free of charge, each self-interested user tries to occupy the channel as much as possible, resulting in the inefficient utilization of network resources. Pricing is therefore adopted as incentive mechanism to encourage users to choose their access probabilities considering the real-time network congestion level. A Stackelberg leader-follower game is formulated to analyze the competitive interaction between the service provider and the users. In particular, each user chooses the access probability that optimizes its payoff, while the self-interested service provider decides whether to admit or to reject the user's connection request in order to optimize its revenue. The stability of the Stackelberg leader-follower game in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is established. The proposed CAC scheme is completely distributed and can be implemented by individual access points using only local information. Compared to the existing schemes, the proposed scheme achieves higher revenue gain, higher user payoff, and higher QoS performance.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.E98.B.2280},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={November},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Facilitating Incentive-Compatible Access Probability Selection in Wireless Random Access Networks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 2280
EP - 2290
AU - Bo GU
AU - Cheng ZHANG
AU - Kyoko YAMORI
AU - Zhenyu ZHOU
AU - Song LIU
AU - Yoshiaki TANAKA
PY - 2015
DO - 10.1587/transcom.E98.B.2280
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E98-B
IS - 11
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - November 2015
AB - This paper studies the impact of integrating pricing with connection admission control (CAC) on the congestion management practices in contention-based wireless random access networks. Notably, when the network is free of charge, each self-interested user tries to occupy the channel as much as possible, resulting in the inefficient utilization of network resources. Pricing is therefore adopted as incentive mechanism to encourage users to choose their access probabilities considering the real-time network congestion level. A Stackelberg leader-follower game is formulated to analyze the competitive interaction between the service provider and the users. In particular, each user chooses the access probability that optimizes its payoff, while the self-interested service provider decides whether to admit or to reject the user's connection request in order to optimize its revenue. The stability of the Stackelberg leader-follower game in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is established. The proposed CAC scheme is completely distributed and can be implemented by individual access points using only local information. Compared to the existing schemes, the proposed scheme achieves higher revenue gain, higher user payoff, and higher QoS performance.
ER -
English
