Evaluation of Information Leakage from Cryptographic Hardware via Common-Mode Current

Yu-ichi HAYASHI; Naofumi HOMMA; Takaaki MIZUKI; Takeshi SUGAWARA; Yoshiki KAYANO; Takafumi AOKI; Shigeki MINEGISHI; Akashi SATOH; Hideaki SONE; Hiroshi INOUE

doi:10.1587/transele.E95.C.1089

Evaluation of Information Leakage from Cryptographic Hardware via Common-Mode Current

Yu-ichi HAYASHI, Naofumi HOMMA, Takaaki MIZUKI, Takeshi SUGAWARA, Yoshiki KAYANO, Takafumi AOKI, Shigeki MINEGISHI, Akashi SATOH, Hideaki SONE, Hiroshi INOUE

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This paper presents a possibility of Electromagnetic (EM) analysis against cryptographic modules outside their security boundaries. The mechanism behind the information leakage is explained from the view point of Electromagnetic Compatibility: electric fluctuation released from cryptographic modules can conduct to peripheral circuits based on ground bounce, resulting in radiation. We demonstrate the consequence of the mechanism through experiments where the ISO/IEC standard block cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is implemented on an FPGA board and EM radiations from power and communication cables are measured. Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) is conducted in order to evaluate the information leakage. The experimental results show that secret keys are revealed even though there are various disturbing factors such as voltage regulators and AC/DC converters between the target module and the measurement points. We also discuss information-suppression techniques as electrical-level countermeasures against such CEMAs.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Electronics Vol.E95-C No.6 pp.1089-1097

Publication Date: 2012/06/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1353

DOI: 10.1587/transele.E95.C.1089

Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Electronic Components

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Yu-ichi HAYASHI, Naofumi HOMMA, Takaaki MIZUKI, Takeshi SUGAWARA, Yoshiki KAYANO, Takafumi AOKI, Shigeki MINEGISHI, Akashi SATOH, Hideaki SONE, Hiroshi INOUE, "Evaluation of Information Leakage from Cryptographic Hardware via Common-Mode Current" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Electronics, vol. E95-C, no. 6, pp. 1089-1097, June 2012, doi: 10.1587/transele.E95.C.1089.
Abstract: This paper presents a possibility of Electromagnetic (EM) analysis against cryptographic modules outside their security boundaries. The mechanism behind the information leakage is explained from the view point of Electromagnetic Compatibility: electric fluctuation released from cryptographic modules can conduct to peripheral circuits based on ground bounce, resulting in radiation. We demonstrate the consequence of the mechanism through experiments where the ISO/IEC standard block cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is implemented on an FPGA board and EM radiations from power and communication cables are measured. Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) is conducted in order to evaluate the information leakage. The experimental results show that secret keys are revealed even though there are various disturbing factors such as voltage regulators and AC/DC converters between the target module and the measurement points. We also discuss information-suppression techniques as electrical-level countermeasures against such CEMAs.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/electronics/10.1587/transele.E95.C.1089/_p

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@ARTICLE{e95-c_6_1089,
author={Yu-ichi HAYASHI, Naofumi HOMMA, Takaaki MIZUKI, Takeshi SUGAWARA, Yoshiki KAYANO, Takafumi AOKI, Shigeki MINEGISHI, Akashi SATOH, Hideaki SONE, Hiroshi INOUE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Electronics},
title={Evaluation of Information Leakage from Cryptographic Hardware via Common-Mode Current},
year={2012},
volume={E95-C},
number={6},
pages={1089-1097},
abstract={This paper presents a possibility of Electromagnetic (EM) analysis against cryptographic modules outside their security boundaries. The mechanism behind the information leakage is explained from the view point of Electromagnetic Compatibility: electric fluctuation released from cryptographic modules can conduct to peripheral circuits based on ground bounce, resulting in radiation. We demonstrate the consequence of the mechanism through experiments where the ISO/IEC standard block cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is implemented on an FPGA board and EM radiations from power and communication cables are measured. Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) is conducted in order to evaluate the information leakage. The experimental results show that secret keys are revealed even though there are various disturbing factors such as voltage regulators and AC/DC converters between the target module and the measurement points. We also discuss information-suppression techniques as electrical-level countermeasures against such CEMAs.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transele.E95.C.1089},
ISSN={1745-1353},
month={June},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Evaluation of Information Leakage from Cryptographic Hardware via Common-Mode Current
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Electronics
SP - 1089
EP - 1097
AU - Yu-ichi HAYASHI
AU - Naofumi HOMMA
AU - Takaaki MIZUKI
AU - Takeshi SUGAWARA
AU - Yoshiki KAYANO
AU - Takafumi AOKI
AU - Shigeki MINEGISHI
AU - Akashi SATOH
AU - Hideaki SONE
AU - Hiroshi INOUE
PY - 2012
DO - 10.1587/transele.E95.C.1089
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Electronics
SN - 1745-1353
VL - E95-C
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Electronics
Y1 - June 2012
AB - This paper presents a possibility of Electromagnetic (EM) analysis against cryptographic modules outside their security boundaries. The mechanism behind the information leakage is explained from the view point of Electromagnetic Compatibility: electric fluctuation released from cryptographic modules can conduct to peripheral circuits based on ground bounce, resulting in radiation. We demonstrate the consequence of the mechanism through experiments where the ISO/IEC standard block cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is implemented on an FPGA board and EM radiations from power and communication cables are measured. Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) is conducted in order to evaluate the information leakage. The experimental results show that secret keys are revealed even though there are various disturbing factors such as voltage regulators and AC/DC converters between the target module and the measurement points. We also discuss information-suppression techniques as electrical-level countermeasures against such CEMAs.
ER -