IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Proactive Defense Mechanism against IP Spoofing Traffic on a NEMO Environment
Summary :
The boundary of a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, one of the most threatening attacks in a wired network, now extends to wireless mobile networks, following the appearance of a DDoS attack tool targeted at mobile phones. However, the existing defense mechanisms against such attacks in a wired network are not effective in a wireless mobile network, because of differences in their characteristics such as the mobile possibility of attack agents. In this paper, we propose a proactive defense mechanism against IP spoofing traffic for mobile networks. IP spoofing is one of the features of a DDoS attack against which it is most difficult to defend. Among the various mobile networks, we focus on the Network Mobility standard that is being established by the NEMO Working Group in the IETF. Our defense consists of following five processes: speedy detection, filtering of attack packets, identification of attack agents, isolation of attack agents, and notification to neighboring routers. We simulated and analyzed the effects on normal traffic of moving attack agents, and the results of applying our defense to a mobile network. Our simulation results show that our mechanism provides a robust defense.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E89-A No.7 pp.1959-1967
- Publication Date
- 2006/07/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.7.1959
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Multi-dimensional Mobile Information Networks)
- Category
Authors
Keyword
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Mihui KIM, Kijoon CHAE, "Proactive Defense Mechanism against IP Spoofing Traffic on a NEMO Environment" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E89-A, no. 7, pp. 1959-1967, July 2006, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.7.1959.
Abstract: The boundary of a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, one of the most threatening attacks in a wired network, now extends to wireless mobile networks, following the appearance of a DDoS attack tool targeted at mobile phones. However, the existing defense mechanisms against such attacks in a wired network are not effective in a wireless mobile network, because of differences in their characteristics such as the mobile possibility of attack agents. In this paper, we propose a proactive defense mechanism against IP spoofing traffic for mobile networks. IP spoofing is one of the features of a DDoS attack against which it is most difficult to defend. Among the various mobile networks, we focus on the Network Mobility standard that is being established by the NEMO Working Group in the IETF. Our defense consists of following five processes: speedy detection, filtering of attack packets, identification of attack agents, isolation of attack agents, and notification to neighboring routers. We simulated and analyzed the effects on normal traffic of moving attack agents, and the results of applying our defense to a mobile network. Our simulation results show that our mechanism provides a robust defense.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.7.1959/_p
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@ARTICLE{e89-a_7_1959,
author={Mihui KIM, Kijoon CHAE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Proactive Defense Mechanism against IP Spoofing Traffic on a NEMO Environment},
year={2006},
volume={E89-A},
number={7},
pages={1959-1967},
abstract={The boundary of a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, one of the most threatening attacks in a wired network, now extends to wireless mobile networks, following the appearance of a DDoS attack tool targeted at mobile phones. However, the existing defense mechanisms against such attacks in a wired network are not effective in a wireless mobile network, because of differences in their characteristics such as the mobile possibility of attack agents. In this paper, we propose a proactive defense mechanism against IP spoofing traffic for mobile networks. IP spoofing is one of the features of a DDoS attack against which it is most difficult to defend. Among the various mobile networks, we focus on the Network Mobility standard that is being established by the NEMO Working Group in the IETF. Our defense consists of following five processes: speedy detection, filtering of attack packets, identification of attack agents, isolation of attack agents, and notification to neighboring routers. We simulated and analyzed the effects on normal traffic of moving attack agents, and the results of applying our defense to a mobile network. Our simulation results show that our mechanism provides a robust defense.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.7.1959},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={July},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Proactive Defense Mechanism against IP Spoofing Traffic on a NEMO Environment
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1959
EP - 1967
AU - Mihui KIM
AU - Kijoon CHAE
PY - 2006
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.7.1959
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E89-A
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - July 2006
AB - The boundary of a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, one of the most threatening attacks in a wired network, now extends to wireless mobile networks, following the appearance of a DDoS attack tool targeted at mobile phones. However, the existing defense mechanisms against such attacks in a wired network are not effective in a wireless mobile network, because of differences in their characteristics such as the mobile possibility of attack agents. In this paper, we propose a proactive defense mechanism against IP spoofing traffic for mobile networks. IP spoofing is one of the features of a DDoS attack against which it is most difficult to defend. Among the various mobile networks, we focus on the Network Mobility standard that is being established by the NEMO Working Group in the IETF. Our defense consists of following five processes: speedy detection, filtering of attack packets, identification of attack agents, isolation of attack agents, and notification to neighboring routers. We simulated and analyzed the effects on normal traffic of moving attack agents, and the results of applying our defense to a mobile network. Our simulation results show that our mechanism provides a robust defense.
ER -
English
