On the Security of the Okamoto-Tanaka ID-Based Key Exchange Scheme against Active Attacks

Seungjoo KIM; Masahiro MAMBO; Takeshi OKAMOTO; Hiroki SHIZUYA; Mitsuru TADA; Dongho WON

On the Security of the Okamoto-Tanaka ID-Based Key Exchange Scheme against Active Attacks

Seungjoo KIM, Masahiro MAMBO, Takeshi OKAMOTO, Hiroki SHIZUYA, Mitsuru TADA, Dongho WON

Full Text Views

0

Cite this

Summary :

As far as the knowledge of authors, the rigorous security of Okamoto-Tanaka identity-based key exchange scheme was shown in [4] for the first time since its invention. However, the analysis deals with only the passive attack. In this paper, we give several models of active attacks against the scheme and show the rigorous security of the scheme in these models. We prove several relationships among attack models, including that (1) breaking the scheme in one attack model is equivalent to breaking the RSA public-key cryptosystem and (2) breaking the scheme in another attack model is equivalent to breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme over Z_n. The difference of the complexity stems from the difference of the timing of dishonest party's sending out and receiving messages.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E84-A No.1 pp.231-238

Publication Date: 2001/01/01

Publicized

Online ISSN

DOI

Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

Category

Cite this

Copy

Seungjoo KIM, Masahiro MAMBO, Takeshi OKAMOTO, Hiroki SHIZUYA, Mitsuru TADA, Dongho WON, "On the Security of the Okamoto-Tanaka ID-Based Key Exchange Scheme against Active Attacks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E84-A, no. 1, pp. 231-238, January 2001, doi: .
Abstract: As far as the knowledge of authors, the rigorous security of Okamoto-Tanaka identity-based key exchange scheme was shown in [4] for the first time since its invention. However, the analysis deals with only the passive attack. In this paper, we give several models of active attacks against the scheme and show the rigorous security of the scheme in these models. We prove several relationships among attack models, including that (1) breaking the scheme in one attack model is equivalent to breaking the RSA public-key cryptosystem and (2) breaking the scheme in another attack model is equivalent to breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme over Z_n. The difference of the complexity stems from the difference of the timing of dishonest party's sending out and receiving messages.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e84-a_1_231/_p

Copy

@ARTICLE{e84-a_1_231,
author={Seungjoo KIM, Masahiro MAMBO, Takeshi OKAMOTO, Hiroki SHIZUYA, Mitsuru TADA, Dongho WON, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={On the Security of the Okamoto-Tanaka ID-Based Key Exchange Scheme against Active Attacks},
year={2001},
volume={E84-A},
number={1},
pages={231-238},
abstract={As far as the knowledge of authors, the rigorous security of Okamoto-Tanaka identity-based key exchange scheme was shown in [4] for the first time since its invention. However, the analysis deals with only the passive attack. In this paper, we give several models of active attacks against the scheme and show the rigorous security of the scheme in these models. We prove several relationships among attack models, including that (1) breaking the scheme in one attack model is equivalent to breaking the RSA public-key cryptosystem and (2) breaking the scheme in another attack model is equivalent to breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme over Z_n. The difference of the complexity stems from the difference of the timing of dishonest party's sending out and receiving messages.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}

Copy

TY - JOUR
TI - On the Security of the Okamoto-Tanaka ID-Based Key Exchange Scheme against Active Attacks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 231
EP - 238
AU - Seungjoo KIM
AU - Masahiro MAMBO
AU - Takeshi OKAMOTO
AU - Hiroki SHIZUYA
AU - Mitsuru TADA
AU - Dongho WON
PY - 2001
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E84-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2001
AB - As far as the knowledge of authors, the rigorous security of Okamoto-Tanaka identity-based key exchange scheme was shown in [4] for the first time since its invention. However, the analysis deals with only the passive attack. In this paper, we give several models of active attacks against the scheme and show the rigorous security of the scheme in these models. We prove several relationships among attack models, including that (1) breaking the scheme in one attack model is equivalent to breaking the RSA public-key cryptosystem and (2) breaking the scheme in another attack model is equivalent to breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme over Z_n. The difference of the complexity stems from the difference of the timing of dishonest party's sending out and receiving messages.
ER -