IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
A Length-invariant Hybrid Mix
Summary :
This paper presents a Mix-net that has the following properties; (1) it efficiently handles long plaintexts that exceed the modulus size of the underlying public-key encryption scheme as well as very short ones (length-flexibility), (2) input ciphertext length is not impacted by the number of mix-servers (length-invariance), and (3) its security in terms of anonymity can be proven in a formal way (probable security). If desired, one can add robustness so that it outputs correct results in the presence of corrupt users and servers. The security is proven in such a sense that breaking the anonymity of our Mix-net is equivalent to breaking the indistinguishability assumption of the underlying symmetric encryption scheme or the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E84-A No.4 pp.931-940
- Publication Date
- 2001/04/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
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- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Fundamentals of Information and Communications)
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Miyako OHKUBO, Masayuki ABE, "A Length-invariant Hybrid Mix" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E84-A, no. 4, pp. 931-940, April 2001, doi: .
Abstract: This paper presents a Mix-net that has the following properties; (1) it efficiently handles long plaintexts that exceed the modulus size of the underlying public-key encryption scheme as well as very short ones (length-flexibility), (2) input ciphertext length is not impacted by the number of mix-servers (length-invariance), and (3) its security in terms of anonymity can be proven in a formal way (probable security). If desired, one can add robustness so that it outputs correct results in the presence of corrupt users and servers. The security is proven in such a sense that breaking the anonymity of our Mix-net is equivalent to breaking the indistinguishability assumption of the underlying symmetric encryption scheme or the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e84-a_4_931/_p
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@ARTICLE{e84-a_4_931,
author={Miyako OHKUBO, Masayuki ABE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={A Length-invariant Hybrid Mix},
year={2001},
volume={E84-A},
number={4},
pages={931-940},
abstract={This paper presents a Mix-net that has the following properties; (1) it efficiently handles long plaintexts that exceed the modulus size of the underlying public-key encryption scheme as well as very short ones (length-flexibility), (2) input ciphertext length is not impacted by the number of mix-servers (length-invariance), and (3) its security in terms of anonymity can be proven in a formal way (probable security). If desired, one can add robustness so that it outputs correct results in the presence of corrupt users and servers. The security is proven in such a sense that breaking the anonymity of our Mix-net is equivalent to breaking the indistinguishability assumption of the underlying symmetric encryption scheme or the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={April},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - A Length-invariant Hybrid Mix
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 931
EP - 940
AU - Miyako OHKUBO
AU - Masayuki ABE
PY - 2001
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E84-A
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - April 2001
AB - This paper presents a Mix-net that has the following properties; (1) it efficiently handles long plaintexts that exceed the modulus size of the underlying public-key encryption scheme as well as very short ones (length-flexibility), (2) input ciphertext length is not impacted by the number of mix-servers (length-invariance), and (3) its security in terms of anonymity can be proven in a formal way (probable security). If desired, one can add robustness so that it outputs correct results in the presence of corrupt users and servers. The security is proven in such a sense that breaking the anonymity of our Mix-net is equivalent to breaking the indistinguishability assumption of the underlying symmetric encryption scheme or the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption.
ER -
English
