An Evolutionary Game for Analyzing Switching Behavior of Consumers in Electricity Retail Markets
Summary :
Many countries have deregulated their electricity retail markets to offer lower electricity charges to consumers. However, many consumers have not switched their suppliers after the deregulation, and electricity suppliers do not tend to reduce their charges intensely. This paper proposes an electricity market model and evolutionary game to analyze the behavior of consumers in electricity retail markets. Our model focuses on switching costs such as an effort at switching, costs in searching for other alternatives, and so on. The evolutionary game examines whether consumers choose a strategy involving exploration of new alternatives with the searching costs as “cooperators” or not. Simulation results demonstrate that the share of cooperators was not improved by simply giving rewards for cooperators as compensation for searching costs. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the degree of cooperators in a network among consumers has a vital role in increasing the share of cooperators and switching rate.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E103-A No.2 pp.407-416
- Publication Date
- 2020/02/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Mathematical Systems Science and its Applications)
- Category
Authors
Ryo HASE
Soka University
Norihiko SHINOMIYA
Soka University
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Ryo HASE, Norihiko SHINOMIYA, "An Evolutionary Game for Analyzing Switching Behavior of Consumers in Electricity Retail Markets" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E103-A, no. 2, pp. 407-416, February 2020, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003.
Abstract: Many countries have deregulated their electricity retail markets to offer lower electricity charges to consumers. However, many consumers have not switched their suppliers after the deregulation, and electricity suppliers do not tend to reduce their charges intensely. This paper proposes an electricity market model and evolutionary game to analyze the behavior of consumers in electricity retail markets. Our model focuses on switching costs such as an effort at switching, costs in searching for other alternatives, and so on. The evolutionary game examines whether consumers choose a strategy involving exploration of new alternatives with the searching costs as “cooperators” or not. Simulation results demonstrate that the share of cooperators was not improved by simply giving rewards for cooperators as compensation for searching costs. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the degree of cooperators in a network among consumers has a vital role in increasing the share of cooperators and switching rate.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003/_p
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@ARTICLE{e103-a_2_407,
author={Ryo HASE, Norihiko SHINOMIYA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={An Evolutionary Game for Analyzing Switching Behavior of Consumers in Electricity Retail Markets},
year={2020},
volume={E103-A},
number={2},
pages={407-416},
abstract={Many countries have deregulated their electricity retail markets to offer lower electricity charges to consumers. However, many consumers have not switched their suppliers after the deregulation, and electricity suppliers do not tend to reduce their charges intensely. This paper proposes an electricity market model and evolutionary game to analyze the behavior of consumers in electricity retail markets. Our model focuses on switching costs such as an effort at switching, costs in searching for other alternatives, and so on. The evolutionary game examines whether consumers choose a strategy involving exploration of new alternatives with the searching costs as “cooperators” or not. Simulation results demonstrate that the share of cooperators was not improved by simply giving rewards for cooperators as compensation for searching costs. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the degree of cooperators in a network among consumers has a vital role in increasing the share of cooperators and switching rate.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={February},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - An Evolutionary Game for Analyzing Switching Behavior of Consumers in Electricity Retail Markets
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 407
EP - 416
AU - Ryo HASE
AU - Norihiko SHINOMIYA
PY - 2020
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E103-A
IS - 2
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - February 2020
AB - Many countries have deregulated their electricity retail markets to offer lower electricity charges to consumers. However, many consumers have not switched their suppliers after the deregulation, and electricity suppliers do not tend to reduce their charges intensely. This paper proposes an electricity market model and evolutionary game to analyze the behavior of consumers in electricity retail markets. Our model focuses on switching costs such as an effort at switching, costs in searching for other alternatives, and so on. The evolutionary game examines whether consumers choose a strategy involving exploration of new alternatives with the searching costs as “cooperators” or not. Simulation results demonstrate that the share of cooperators was not improved by simply giving rewards for cooperators as compensation for searching costs. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the degree of cooperators in a network among consumers has a vital role in increasing the share of cooperators and switching rate.
ER -
English
