IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Stability Analysis and Control of Decision-Making of Miners in Blockchain
Summary :
To maintain blockchain-based services with ensuring its security, it is an important issue how to decide a mining reward so that the number of miners participating in the mining increases. We propose a dynamical model of decision-making for miners using an evolutionary game approach and analyze the stability of equilibrium points of the proposed model. The proposed model is described by the 1st-order differential equation. So, it is simple but its theoretical analysis gives an insight into the characteristics of the decision-making. Through the analysis of the equilibrium points, we show the transcritical bifurcations and hysteresis phenomena of the equilibrium points. We also design a controller that determines the mining reward based on the number of participating miners to stabilize the state where all miners participate in the mining. Numerical simulation shows that there is a trade-off in the choice of the design parameters.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E105-A No.4 pp.682-688
- Publication Date
- 2022/04/01
- Publicized
- 2021/10/01
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.2021EAP1099
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Nonlinear Problems
Authors
Kosuke TODA
Osaka University
Naomi KUZE
Osaka University
Toshimitsu USHIO
Osaka University
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Kosuke TODA, Naomi KUZE, Toshimitsu USHIO, "Stability Analysis and Control of Decision-Making of Miners in Blockchain" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E105-A, no. 4, pp. 682-688, April 2022, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2021EAP1099.
Abstract: To maintain blockchain-based services with ensuring its security, it is an important issue how to decide a mining reward so that the number of miners participating in the mining increases. We propose a dynamical model of decision-making for miners using an evolutionary game approach and analyze the stability of equilibrium points of the proposed model. The proposed model is described by the 1st-order differential equation. So, it is simple but its theoretical analysis gives an insight into the characteristics of the decision-making. Through the analysis of the equilibrium points, we show the transcritical bifurcations and hysteresis phenomena of the equilibrium points. We also design a controller that determines the mining reward based on the number of participating miners to stabilize the state where all miners participate in the mining. Numerical simulation shows that there is a trade-off in the choice of the design parameters.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2021EAP1099/_p
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@ARTICLE{e105-a_4_682,
author={Kosuke TODA, Naomi KUZE, Toshimitsu USHIO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Stability Analysis and Control of Decision-Making of Miners in Blockchain},
year={2022},
volume={E105-A},
number={4},
pages={682-688},
abstract={To maintain blockchain-based services with ensuring its security, it is an important issue how to decide a mining reward so that the number of miners participating in the mining increases. We propose a dynamical model of decision-making for miners using an evolutionary game approach and analyze the stability of equilibrium points of the proposed model. The proposed model is described by the 1st-order differential equation. So, it is simple but its theoretical analysis gives an insight into the characteristics of the decision-making. Through the analysis of the equilibrium points, we show the transcritical bifurcations and hysteresis phenomena of the equilibrium points. We also design a controller that determines the mining reward based on the number of participating miners to stabilize the state where all miners participate in the mining. Numerical simulation shows that there is a trade-off in the choice of the design parameters.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2021EAP1099},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={April},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Stability Analysis and Control of Decision-Making of Miners in Blockchain
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 682
EP - 688
AU - Kosuke TODA
AU - Naomi KUZE
AU - Toshimitsu USHIO
PY - 2022
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2021EAP1099
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E105-A
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - April 2022
AB - To maintain blockchain-based services with ensuring its security, it is an important issue how to decide a mining reward so that the number of miners participating in the mining increases. We propose a dynamical model of decision-making for miners using an evolutionary game approach and analyze the stability of equilibrium points of the proposed model. The proposed model is described by the 1st-order differential equation. So, it is simple but its theoretical analysis gives an insight into the characteristics of the decision-making. Through the analysis of the equilibrium points, we show the transcritical bifurcations and hysteresis phenomena of the equilibrium points. We also design a controller that determines the mining reward based on the number of participating miners to stabilize the state where all miners participate in the mining. Numerical simulation shows that there is a trade-off in the choice of the design parameters.
ER -
English
