We present a forward-secure public-key encryption (PKE) scheme without key update, i.e. both public and private keys are immutable. In contrast, prior forward-secure PKE schemes achieve forward security by constantly updating the secret keys. Our scheme is based on witness encryption by Garg et al. (STOC 2013) and a proof-of-stake blockchain with the distinguishable forking property introduced by Goyal et al. (TCC 2017), and ensures a ciphertext cannot be decrypted more than once, thereby rendering a compromised secret key useless with respect to decryption of past ciphertext the legitimate user has already decrypted. In this work, we formalize the notion of blockchain-based forward-secure PKE, show the feasibility of constructing a forward-secure PKE scheme without key update, and discuss interesting properties of our scheme such as post-compromise security.
Seiya NUTA
University of Tsukuba
Jacob C. N. SCHULDT
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Takashi NISHIDE
University of Tsukuba
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Seiya NUTA, Jacob C. N. SCHULDT, Takashi NISHIDE, "PoS Blockchain-Based Forward-Secure Public Key Encryption with Immutable Keys and Post-Compromise Security Guarantees" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E106-A, no. 3, pp. 212-227, March 2023, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0016.
Abstract: We present a forward-secure public-key encryption (PKE) scheme without key update, i.e. both public and private keys are immutable. In contrast, prior forward-secure PKE schemes achieve forward security by constantly updating the secret keys. Our scheme is based on witness encryption by Garg et al. (STOC 2013) and a proof-of-stake blockchain with the distinguishable forking property introduced by Goyal et al. (TCC 2017), and ensures a ciphertext cannot be decrypted more than once, thereby rendering a compromised secret key useless with respect to decryption of past ciphertext the legitimate user has already decrypted. In this work, we formalize the notion of blockchain-based forward-secure PKE, show the feasibility of constructing a forward-secure PKE scheme without key update, and discuss interesting properties of our scheme such as post-compromise security.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0016/_p
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@ARTICLE{e106-a_3_212,
author={Seiya NUTA, Jacob C. N. SCHULDT, Takashi NISHIDE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={PoS Blockchain-Based Forward-Secure Public Key Encryption with Immutable Keys and Post-Compromise Security Guarantees},
year={2023},
volume={E106-A},
number={3},
pages={212-227},
abstract={We present a forward-secure public-key encryption (PKE) scheme without key update, i.e. both public and private keys are immutable. In contrast, prior forward-secure PKE schemes achieve forward security by constantly updating the secret keys. Our scheme is based on witness encryption by Garg et al. (STOC 2013) and a proof-of-stake blockchain with the distinguishable forking property introduced by Goyal et al. (TCC 2017), and ensures a ciphertext cannot be decrypted more than once, thereby rendering a compromised secret key useless with respect to decryption of past ciphertext the legitimate user has already decrypted. In this work, we formalize the notion of blockchain-based forward-secure PKE, show the feasibility of constructing a forward-secure PKE scheme without key update, and discuss interesting properties of our scheme such as post-compromise security.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0016},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={March},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - PoS Blockchain-Based Forward-Secure Public Key Encryption with Immutable Keys and Post-Compromise Security Guarantees
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 212
EP - 227
AU - Seiya NUTA
AU - Jacob C. N. SCHULDT
AU - Takashi NISHIDE
PY - 2023
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0016
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E106-A
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - March 2023
AB - We present a forward-secure public-key encryption (PKE) scheme without key update, i.e. both public and private keys are immutable. In contrast, prior forward-secure PKE schemes achieve forward security by constantly updating the secret keys. Our scheme is based on witness encryption by Garg et al. (STOC 2013) and a proof-of-stake blockchain with the distinguishable forking property introduced by Goyal et al. (TCC 2017), and ensures a ciphertext cannot be decrypted more than once, thereby rendering a compromised secret key useless with respect to decryption of past ciphertext the legitimate user has already decrypted. In this work, we formalize the notion of blockchain-based forward-secure PKE, show the feasibility of constructing a forward-secure PKE scheme without key update, and discuss interesting properties of our scheme such as post-compromise security.
ER -