We present a forward-secure public-key encryption (PKE) scheme without key update, i.e. both public and private keys are immutable. In contrast, prior forward-secure PKE schemes achieve forward security by constantly updating the secret keys. Our scheme is based on witness encryption by Garg et al. (STOC 2013) and a proof-of-stake blockchain with the distinguishable forking property introduced by Goyal et al. (TCC 2017), and ensures a ciphertext cannot be decrypted more than once, thereby rendering a compromised secret key useless with respect to decryption of past ciphertext the legitimate user has already decrypted. In this work, we formalize the notion of blockchain-based forward-secure PKE, show the feasibility of constructing a forward-secure PKE scheme without key update, and discuss interesting properties of our scheme such as post-compromise security.

We propose how to homomorphically evaluate arbitrary univariate and bivariate integer functions such as division. A prior work proposed by Okada et al. (WISTP'18) uses polynomial evaluations such that the scheme is still compatible with the SIMD operations in BFV and BGV schemes, and is implemented with the input domain ℤ257. However, the scheme of Okada et al. requires the quadratic numbers of plaintext-ciphertext multiplications and ciphertext-ciphertext additions in the input domain size, and although these operations are more lightweight than the ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication, the quadratic complexity makes handling larger inputs quite inefficient. In this work, first we improve the prior work and also propose a new approach that exploits the packing method to handle the larger input domain size instead of enabling the SIMD operation, thus making it possible to work with the larger input domain size, e.g., ℤ215 in a reasonably efficient way. In addition, we show how to slightly extend the input domain size to ℤ216 with a relatively moderate overhead. Further we show another approach to handling the larger input domain size by using two ciphertexts to encrypt one integer plaintext and applying our techniques for uni/bivariate function evaluation. We implement the prior work of Okada et al., our improved version of Okada et al., and our new scheme in PALISADE with the input domain ℤ215, and confirm that the estimated run-times of the prior work and our improved version of the prior work are still about 117 days and 59 days respectively while our new scheme can be computed in 307 seconds.

We consider the problems of access control and encrypted keyword search for cryptographic cloud storage in such a way that they can be implemented for a multiple users setting. Our fine-grained access control aware multi-user secure keyword search approach interdependently harmonizes these two security notions, access control and encrypted keyword search. Owing to the shrinkage of the cloud server's search space to the user's decryptable subset, the proposed scheme both decreases information leakage and is shown to be efficient by the results of our contrastive performance simulation.

Multiparty computation (MPC) is a cryptographic method that enables a set of parties to compute an arbitrary joint function of the private inputs of all parties and does not reveal any information other than the output. MPC based on a secret sharing scheme (SS-MPC) and garbled circuit (GC) is known as the most common MPC schemes. Another cryptographic method, homomorphic encryption (HE), computes an arbitrary function represented as a circuit by using ciphertexts without decrypting them. These technologies are in a trade-off relationship for the communication/round complexities, and the computation cost. The private decision tree evaluation (PDTE) is one of the key applications of these technologies. There exist several constant-round PDTE protocols based on GC, HE, or the hybrid schemes that are secure even if a malicious adversary who can deviate from protocol specifications corrupts some parties. There also exist other protocols based only on SS-MPC that are secure only if a semi-honest adversary who follows the protocol specification corrupts some parties. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are currently no constant-round PDTE protocols based only on SS-MPC that are secure against a malicious adversary. In this work, we propose a constant-round four-party PDTE protocol that achieves malicious security. Our protocol provides the PDTE securely and efficiently even when the communication environment has a large latency.

Recently, there is much concern about the provenance of distributed processes, that is about the documentation of the origin and the processes to produce an object in a distributed system. The provenance has many applications in the forms of medical records, documentation of processes in the computer systems, recording the origin of data in the cloud, and also documentation of human-executed processes. The provenance of distributed processes can be modeled by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where each node represents an entity, and an edge represents the origin and causal relationship between entities. Without sufficient security mechanisms, the provenance graph suffers from integrity and confidentiality problems, for example changes or deletions of the correct nodes, additions of fake nodes and edges, and unauthorized accesses to the sensitive nodes and edges. In this paper, we propose an integrity mechanism for provenance graph using the digital signature involving three parties: the process executors who are responsible in the nodes' creation, a provenance owner that records the nodes to the provenance store, and a trusted party that we call the Trusted Counter Server (TCS) that records the number of nodes stored by the provenance owner. We show that the mechanism can detect the integrity problem in the provenance graph, namely unauthorized and malicious “authorized” updates even if all the parties, except the TCS, collude to update the provenance. In this scheme, the TCS only needs a very minimal storage (linear with the number of the provenance owners). To protect the confidentiality and for an efficient access control administration, we propose a method to encrypt the provenance graph that allows access by paths and compartments in the provenance graph. We argue that encryption is important as a mechanism to protect the provenance data stored in an untrusted environment. We analyze the security of the integrity mechanism, and perform experiments to measure the performance of both mechanisms.

Multiparty computation (MPC) is the technology that computes an arbitrary function represented as a circuit without revealing input values. Typical MPC uses secret sharing (SS) schemes, garbled circuit (GC), and homomorphic encryption (HE). These cryptographic technologies have a trade-off relationship for the computation cost, communication cost, and type of computable circuit. Hence, the optimal choice depends on the computing resources, communication environment, and function related to applications. The private decision tree evaluation (PDTE) is one of the important applications of secure computation. There exist several PDTE protocols with constant communication rounds using GC, HE, and SS-MPC over the field. However, to the best of our knowledge, PDTE protocols with constant communication rounds using MPC based on SS over the ring (requiring only lower computation costs and communication complexity) are non-trivial and still missing. In this paper, we propose a PDTE protocol based on a three-party computation (3PC) protocol over the ring with one corruption. We also propose another three-party PDTE protocol over the field with one corruption that is more efficient than the naive construction.

It is known that, using just a deck of cards, an arbitrary number of parties with private inputs can securely compute the output of any function of their inputs. In 2009, Mizuki and Sone constructed a six-card COPY protocol, a four-card XOR protocol, and a six-card AND protocol, based on a commonly used encoding scheme in which each input bit is encoded using two cards. However, up until now, there are no known results to construct a set of COPY, XOR, and AND protocols based on a two-card-per-bit encoding scheme, which all can be implemented using only four cards. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct four-card COPY, XOR, and AND protocols using polarizing plates as cards and a corresponding two-card-per-bit encoding scheme. Our protocols use a minimum number of cards in the setting of two-card-per-bit encoding schemes since four cards are always required to encode the inputs. Moreover, we show that it is possible to construct two-card COPY, two-card XOR, and three-card AND protocols based on a one-card-per-bit encoding scheme using a common reference polarizer which is a polarizing material accessible to all parties.

By using Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE), a server can authenticate a user who has only the same password shared with the server in advance and establish a session key with the user simultaneously. However, in the real applications, we may have a situation where a user needs to share a session key with server A, but the authentication needs to be done by a different server B that shares the password with the user. Further, to achieve higher security on the server side, it may be required to make PAKE tolerant of a server breach by having multiple authentication servers. To deal with such a situation, Abdalla et al. proposed a variant of PAKE called Gateway Threshold PAKE (GTPAKE) where a gateway corresponds to the aforementioned server A being an on-line service provider and also a potential adversary that may try to guess the passwords. However, the schemes of Abdalla et al. turned out to be vulnerable to Undetectable On-line Dictionary Attack (UDonDA). In this paper, we propose the first GTPAKE provably secure against UDonDA, and in the security analysis, we prove that our GTPAKE is secure even if an adversary breaks into parts of multiple authentication servers.

Sharding is a solution to the blockchain scalability problem. A sharded blockchain divides consensus nodes (validators) into groups called shards and processes transactions separately to improve throughput and latency. In this paper, we analyze the rational behavior of users in account/balance model-based sharded blockchains and identify a phenomenon in which accounts (users' wallets and smart contracts) eventually get concentrated in a few shards, making shard loads unfair. This phenomenon leads to bad user experiences, such as delays in transaction inclusions and increased transaction fees. To solve this problem, we propose two load balancing methods in account/balance model-based sharded blockchains. Both methods perform load balancing by periodically reassigning accounts: in the first method, the blockchain protocol itself performs load balancing and in the second method, wallets perform load balancing. We discuss the pros and cons of the two protocols, and apply the protocols to the execution sharding in Ethereum 2.0, an existing sharding design. Further, we analyze by simulation how the protocols behave to confirm that we can observe smaller transaction delays and fees. As a result, we released the simulation program as “Shargri-La,” a simulator designed for general-purpose user behavior analysis on the execution sharding in Ethereum 2.0.

We propose attribute-based encryption schemes where encryptor-specified policies (called ciphertext policies) are hidden. By using our schemes, an encryptor can encrypt data with a hidden access control policy. A decryptor obtains her secret key associated with her attributes from a trusted authority in advance and if the attributes associated with the decryptor's secret key do not satisfy the access control policy associated with the encrypted data, the decryptor cannot decrypt the data or guess even what access control policy was specified by the encryptor. We prove security of our construction based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and the Decision Linear assumption. In our security notion, even the legitimate decryptor cannot obtain the information about the access control policy associated with the encrypted data more than the fact that she can decrypt the data.

Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT) has shown impressive results among recently developed regularization methods called consistency regularization. VAT utilizes adversarial samples, generated by injecting perturbation in the input space, for training and thereby enhances the generalization ability of a classifier. However, such adversarial samples can be generated only within a very small area around the input data point, which limits the adversarial effectiveness of such samples. To address this problem we propose LVAT (Latent space VAT), which injects perturbation in the latent space instead of the input space. LVAT can generate adversarial samples flexibly, resulting in more adverse effect and thus more effective regularization. The latent space is built by a generative model, and in this paper we examine two different type of models: variational auto-encoder and normalizing flow, specifically Glow. We evaluated the performance of our method in both supervised and semi-supervised learning scenarios for an image classification task using SVHN and CIFAR-10 datasets. In our evaluation, we found that our method outperforms VAT and other state-of-the-art methods.

We propose constant-round protocols for interval tests, equality tests, and comparisons where shared secret inputs are not given bitwise. In [9]. Damgård et al. presented a novel protocol called the bit-decomposition, which can convert a polynomial sharing of an element in prime field Zp into sharings of bits. Though, by using the bit-decomposition protocol, those protocols can be constructed with constant round complexities theoretically, it involves expensive computation, leading to relatively high round and communication complexities. In this paper, we construct more efficient protocols for those protocols without relying on the bit-decomposition protocol. In the interval test protocol, checking whether a shared secret exists in the known interval is reduced to checking whether a bitwise-shared random secret exists in the appropriate interval. In the comparison protocol, comparing two shared secrets is reduced to comparing the two secrets viaindirectly where p is an odd prime for an underlying linear secret sharing scheme. In the equality test protocol, checking whether two shared secrets are equal is reduced to checking whether the difference of the two secrets is zero and furthermore checking whether the difference is a zero is reduced to checking quadratice residuosity of a random secret in a probabilistic way.

It is becoming more and more important to make use of personal or classified information while keeping it confidential. A promising tool for meeting this challenge is secure multi-party computation (MPC). It enables multiple parties, each given a snippet of a secret s, to compute a function f(s) by communicating with each other without revealing s. However, one of the biggest problems with MPC is that it requires a vast amount of communication. Much research has gone into making each protocol (equality testing, interval testing, etc.) more efficient. In this work, we make a set of multiple protocols more efficient by transforming them into their equivalent batch processing form and propose two protocols: “Batch Logical OR” and “Batch Logical AND.” Using proposed protocols recursively, we also propose “Batch Logical OR-AND” and “Batch Logical AND-OR,” and show arbitrary formula consisting of Boolean protocols, OR gates, and AND gates can be batched. Existing logical OR and logical AND protocols consisting of t equality testing invocations have a communication complexity of O(t), where is the bit length of the secrets. Our batched versions of these protocols reduce it to O( + t). For t interval testing invocations, they reduce both communication and round complexity. Thus they can make the queries on a secret shared database more efficient. For example, the use of the proposed protocols reduces the communication complexity for a query consisting of equality testing and interval testing by approximately 70% compared to the use of the corresponding existing protocols. The concept of the proposed protocols is versatile and can be applied to logical formulae consisting of protocols other than equality testing and interval testing, thereby making them more efficient as well.

Cryptographic protocols enable participating parties to compute any function of their inputs without leaking any information beyond the output. A card-based protocol is a cryptographic protocol implemented by physical cards. In this paper, for constructing protocols with small numbers of shuffles, we introduce a new type of cards, regular polygon cards, and a new protocol, oblivious conversion. Using our cards, we construct an addition protocol on non-binary inputs with only one shuffle and two cards. Furthermore, using our oblivious conversion protocol, we construct the first protocol for general functions in which the number of shuffles is linear in the number of inputs.