We propose attribute-based encryption schemes where encryptor-specified policies (called ciphertext policies) are hidden. By using our schemes, an encryptor can encrypt data with a hidden access control policy. A decryptor obtains her secret key associated with her attributes from a trusted authority in advance and if the attributes associated with the decryptor's secret key do not satisfy the access control policy associated with the encrypted data, the decryptor cannot decrypt the data or guess even what access control policy was specified by the encryptor. We prove security of our construction based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and the Decision Linear assumption. In our security notion, even the legitimate decryptor cannot obtain the information about the access control policy associated with the encrypted data more than the fact that she can decrypt the data.
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Takashi NISHIDE, Kazuki YONEYAMA, Kazuo OHTA, "Attribute-Based Encryption with Partially Hidden Ciphertext Policies" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 1, pp. 22-32, January 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.22.
Abstract: We propose attribute-based encryption schemes where encryptor-specified policies (called ciphertext policies) are hidden. By using our schemes, an encryptor can encrypt data with a hidden access control policy. A decryptor obtains her secret key associated with her attributes from a trusted authority in advance and if the attributes associated with the decryptor's secret key do not satisfy the access control policy associated with the encrypted data, the decryptor cannot decrypt the data or guess even what access control policy was specified by the encryptor. We prove security of our construction based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and the Decision Linear assumption. In our security notion, even the legitimate decryptor cannot obtain the information about the access control policy associated with the encrypted data more than the fact that she can decrypt the data.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.22/_p
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@ARTICLE{e92-a_1_22,
author={Takashi NISHIDE, Kazuki YONEYAMA, Kazuo OHTA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Attribute-Based Encryption with Partially Hidden Ciphertext Policies},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={1},
pages={22-32},
abstract={We propose attribute-based encryption schemes where encryptor-specified policies (called ciphertext policies) are hidden. By using our schemes, an encryptor can encrypt data with a hidden access control policy. A decryptor obtains her secret key associated with her attributes from a trusted authority in advance and if the attributes associated with the decryptor's secret key do not satisfy the access control policy associated with the encrypted data, the decryptor cannot decrypt the data or guess even what access control policy was specified by the encryptor. We prove security of our construction based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and the Decision Linear assumption. In our security notion, even the legitimate decryptor cannot obtain the information about the access control policy associated with the encrypted data more than the fact that she can decrypt the data.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.22},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Attribute-Based Encryption with Partially Hidden Ciphertext Policies
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 22
EP - 32
AU - Takashi NISHIDE
AU - Kazuki YONEYAMA
AU - Kazuo OHTA
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.22
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2009
AB - We propose attribute-based encryption schemes where encryptor-specified policies (called ciphertext policies) are hidden. By using our schemes, an encryptor can encrypt data with a hidden access control policy. A decryptor obtains her secret key associated with her attributes from a trusted authority in advance and if the attributes associated with the decryptor's secret key do not satisfy the access control policy associated with the encrypted data, the decryptor cannot decrypt the data or guess even what access control policy was specified by the encryptor. We prove security of our construction based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and the Decision Linear assumption. In our security notion, even the legitimate decryptor cannot obtain the information about the access control policy associated with the encrypted data more than the fact that she can decrypt the data.
ER -