IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Information-Theoretic Perspectives for Simulation-Based Security in Multi-Party Computation
Summary :
Information-theoretic security and computational security are fundamental paradigms of security in the theory of cryptography. The two paradigms interact with each other but have shown different progress, which motivates us to explore the intersection between them. In this paper, we focus on Multi-Party Computation (MPC) because the security of MPC is formulated by simulation-based security, which originates from computational security, even if it requires information-theoretic security. We provide several equivalent formalizations of the security of MPC under a semi-honest model from the viewpoints of information theory and statistics. The interpretations of these variants are so natural that they support the other aspects of simulation-based security. Specifically, the variants based on conditional mutual information and sufficient statistics are interesting because security proofs for those variants can be given by information measures and factorization theorem, respectively. To exemplify this, we show several security proofs of BGW (Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson) protocols, which are basically proved by constructing a simulator.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E107-A No.3 pp.360-372
- Publication Date
- 2024/03/01
- Publicized
- 2023/12/01
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.2023TAI0001
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section INVITED PAPER (Special Section on Information Theory and Its Applications)
- Category
- Cryptography and Information Security
Authors
Mitsugu IWAMOTO
University of Electro-Communications
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Mitsugu IWAMOTO, "Information-Theoretic Perspectives for Simulation-Based Security in Multi-Party Computation" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E107-A, no. 3, pp. 360-372, March 2024, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2023TAI0001.
Abstract: Information-theoretic security and computational security are fundamental paradigms of security in the theory of cryptography. The two paradigms interact with each other but have shown different progress, which motivates us to explore the intersection between them. In this paper, we focus on Multi-Party Computation (MPC) because the security of MPC is formulated by simulation-based security, which originates from computational security, even if it requires information-theoretic security. We provide several equivalent formalizations of the security of MPC under a semi-honest model from the viewpoints of information theory and statistics. The interpretations of these variants are so natural that they support the other aspects of simulation-based security. Specifically, the variants based on conditional mutual information and sufficient statistics are interesting because security proofs for those variants can be given by information measures and factorization theorem, respectively. To exemplify this, we show several security proofs of BGW (Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson) protocols, which are basically proved by constructing a simulator.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2023TAI0001/_p
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@ARTICLE{e107-a_3_360,
author={Mitsugu IWAMOTO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Information-Theoretic Perspectives for Simulation-Based Security in Multi-Party Computation},
year={2024},
volume={E107-A},
number={3},
pages={360-372},
abstract={Information-theoretic security and computational security are fundamental paradigms of security in the theory of cryptography. The two paradigms interact with each other but have shown different progress, which motivates us to explore the intersection between them. In this paper, we focus on Multi-Party Computation (MPC) because the security of MPC is formulated by simulation-based security, which originates from computational security, even if it requires information-theoretic security. We provide several equivalent formalizations of the security of MPC under a semi-honest model from the viewpoints of information theory and statistics. The interpretations of these variants are so natural that they support the other aspects of simulation-based security. Specifically, the variants based on conditional mutual information and sufficient statistics are interesting because security proofs for those variants can be given by information measures and factorization theorem, respectively. To exemplify this, we show several security proofs of BGW (Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson) protocols, which are basically proved by constructing a simulator.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2023TAI0001},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={March},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Information-Theoretic Perspectives for Simulation-Based Security in Multi-Party Computation
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 360
EP - 372
AU - Mitsugu IWAMOTO
PY - 2024
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2023TAI0001
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E107-A
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - March 2024
AB - Information-theoretic security and computational security are fundamental paradigms of security in the theory of cryptography. The two paradigms interact with each other but have shown different progress, which motivates us to explore the intersection between them. In this paper, we focus on Multi-Party Computation (MPC) because the security of MPC is formulated by simulation-based security, which originates from computational security, even if it requires information-theoretic security. We provide several equivalent formalizations of the security of MPC under a semi-honest model from the viewpoints of information theory and statistics. The interpretations of these variants are so natural that they support the other aspects of simulation-based security. Specifically, the variants based on conditional mutual information and sufficient statistics are interesting because security proofs for those variants can be given by information measures and factorization theorem, respectively. To exemplify this, we show several security proofs of BGW (Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson) protocols, which are basically proved by constructing a simulator.
ER -
English
