This letter studies the price-based power control algorithm for the spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks. The primary user (PU) profits from the secondary users (SUs) by pricing the interference power made by them. The SUs cooperate with each other to maximize their sum revenue with the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) balancing condition. The interaction between the PU and the SUs is modeled as a Stackelberg game. Closed-form expressions of the optimal price for the PU and power allocation for the SUs are given. Simulation results show the proposed algorithm improves the revenue of both the PU and fairness of the SUs compared with the uniform pricing algorithm.
Zheng-qiang WANG
Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Xiao-yu WAN
Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Zi-fu FAN
Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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Zheng-qiang WANG, Xiao-yu WAN, Zi-fu FAN, "Fair Power Control Algorithm in Cognitive Radio Networks Based on Stackelberg Game" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E100-A, no. 8, pp. 1738-1741, August 2017, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1738.
Abstract: This letter studies the price-based power control algorithm for the spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks. The primary user (PU) profits from the secondary users (SUs) by pricing the interference power made by them. The SUs cooperate with each other to maximize their sum revenue with the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) balancing condition. The interaction between the PU and the SUs is modeled as a Stackelberg game. Closed-form expressions of the optimal price for the PU and power allocation for the SUs are given. Simulation results show the proposed algorithm improves the revenue of both the PU and fairness of the SUs compared with the uniform pricing algorithm.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1738/_p
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@ARTICLE{e100-a_8_1738,
author={Zheng-qiang WANG, Xiao-yu WAN, Zi-fu FAN, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Fair Power Control Algorithm in Cognitive Radio Networks Based on Stackelberg Game},
year={2017},
volume={E100-A},
number={8},
pages={1738-1741},
abstract={This letter studies the price-based power control algorithm for the spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks. The primary user (PU) profits from the secondary users (SUs) by pricing the interference power made by them. The SUs cooperate with each other to maximize their sum revenue with the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) balancing condition. The interaction between the PU and the SUs is modeled as a Stackelberg game. Closed-form expressions of the optimal price for the PU and power allocation for the SUs are given. Simulation results show the proposed algorithm improves the revenue of both the PU and fairness of the SUs compared with the uniform pricing algorithm.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1738},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={August},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Fair Power Control Algorithm in Cognitive Radio Networks Based on Stackelberg Game
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1738
EP - 1741
AU - Zheng-qiang WANG
AU - Xiao-yu WAN
AU - Zi-fu FAN
PY - 2017
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1738
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E100-A
IS - 8
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - August 2017
AB - This letter studies the price-based power control algorithm for the spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks. The primary user (PU) profits from the secondary users (SUs) by pricing the interference power made by them. The SUs cooperate with each other to maximize their sum revenue with the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) balancing condition. The interaction between the PU and the SUs is modeled as a Stackelberg game. Closed-form expressions of the optimal price for the PU and power allocation for the SUs are given. Simulation results show the proposed algorithm improves the revenue of both the PU and fairness of the SUs compared with the uniform pricing algorithm.
ER -