IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
How to Efficiently Exploit Different Types of Biases for Plaintext Recovery of RC4
Summary :
RC4 is a well-known stream cipher designed by Rivest. Due to considerable cryptanalysis efforts over past 20 years, several kinds of statistic biases in a key stream of RC4 have been observed so far. Finally, practical full plaintext recovery attacks on RC4 in SSL/TLS were independently proposed by AlFardan et al. and Isobe et al. in 2013. Responded to these attacks, usage of RC4 has drastically decreased in SSL/TLS. However, according to the research by Trustworthy Internet Movement, RC4 is still used by some websites for the encryption on SSL/TLS. In this paper, we shows a new plaintext recovery attack for RC4 under the assumption of HTTPS. We develop a method for exploiting single-byte and double-byte biases together to efficiently guess the target bytes, while previous attacks use either single-byte biases or double-byte biases. As a result, target plaintext bytes can be extracted with higher probability than previous best attacks given 229 ciphertexts encrypted by randomly-chosen keys. In the most efficient case, the success probability of our attack are more than twice compared to previous best attacks.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E100-A No.3 pp.803-810
- Publication Date
- 2017/03/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.803
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Cryptography and Information Security
Authors
Yuhei WATANABE
Kobe University
Takanori ISOBE
Kobe University
Toshihiro OHIGASHI
Tokai University
Masakatu MORII
Kobe University
Keyword
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Yuhei WATANABE, Takanori ISOBE, Toshihiro OHIGASHI, Masakatu MORII, "How to Efficiently Exploit Different Types of Biases for Plaintext Recovery of RC4" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E100-A, no. 3, pp. 803-810, March 2017, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.803.
Abstract: RC4 is a well-known stream cipher designed by Rivest. Due to considerable cryptanalysis efforts over past 20 years, several kinds of statistic biases in a key stream of RC4 have been observed so far. Finally, practical full plaintext recovery attacks on RC4 in SSL/TLS were independently proposed by AlFardan et al. and Isobe et al. in 2013. Responded to these attacks, usage of RC4 has drastically decreased in SSL/TLS. However, according to the research by Trustworthy Internet Movement, RC4 is still used by some websites for the encryption on SSL/TLS. In this paper, we shows a new plaintext recovery attack for RC4 under the assumption of HTTPS. We develop a method for exploiting single-byte and double-byte biases together to efficiently guess the target bytes, while previous attacks use either single-byte biases or double-byte biases. As a result, target plaintext bytes can be extracted with higher probability than previous best attacks given 229 ciphertexts encrypted by randomly-chosen keys. In the most efficient case, the success probability of our attack are more than twice compared to previous best attacks.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E100.A.803/_p
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@ARTICLE{e100-a_3_803,
author={Yuhei WATANABE, Takanori ISOBE, Toshihiro OHIGASHI, Masakatu MORII, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={How to Efficiently Exploit Different Types of Biases for Plaintext Recovery of RC4},
year={2017},
volume={E100-A},
number={3},
pages={803-810},
abstract={RC4 is a well-known stream cipher designed by Rivest. Due to considerable cryptanalysis efforts over past 20 years, several kinds of statistic biases in a key stream of RC4 have been observed so far. Finally, practical full plaintext recovery attacks on RC4 in SSL/TLS were independently proposed by AlFardan et al. and Isobe et al. in 2013. Responded to these attacks, usage of RC4 has drastically decreased in SSL/TLS. However, according to the research by Trustworthy Internet Movement, RC4 is still used by some websites for the encryption on SSL/TLS. In this paper, we shows a new plaintext recovery attack for RC4 under the assumption of HTTPS. We develop a method for exploiting single-byte and double-byte biases together to efficiently guess the target bytes, while previous attacks use either single-byte biases or double-byte biases. As a result, target plaintext bytes can be extracted with higher probability than previous best attacks given 229 ciphertexts encrypted by randomly-chosen keys. In the most efficient case, the success probability of our attack are more than twice compared to previous best attacks.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E100.A.803},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={March},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - How to Efficiently Exploit Different Types of Biases for Plaintext Recovery of RC4
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 803
EP - 810
AU - Yuhei WATANABE
AU - Takanori ISOBE
AU - Toshihiro OHIGASHI
AU - Masakatu MORII
PY - 2017
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.803
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E100-A
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - March 2017
AB - RC4 is a well-known stream cipher designed by Rivest. Due to considerable cryptanalysis efforts over past 20 years, several kinds of statistic biases in a key stream of RC4 have been observed so far. Finally, practical full plaintext recovery attacks on RC4 in SSL/TLS were independently proposed by AlFardan et al. and Isobe et al. in 2013. Responded to these attacks, usage of RC4 has drastically decreased in SSL/TLS. However, according to the research by Trustworthy Internet Movement, RC4 is still used by some websites for the encryption on SSL/TLS. In this paper, we shows a new plaintext recovery attack for RC4 under the assumption of HTTPS. We develop a method for exploiting single-byte and double-byte biases together to efficiently guess the target bytes, while previous attacks use either single-byte biases or double-byte biases. As a result, target plaintext bytes can be extracted with higher probability than previous best attacks given 229 ciphertexts encrypted by randomly-chosen keys. In the most efficient case, the success probability of our attack are more than twice compared to previous best attacks.
ER -
English
