IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Improved Integral Attack on HIGHT
Summary :
HIGHT is a 64-bit block lightweight cipher, which adopts the ARX-based generalized Feistel network, and it accepts a 128-bit key. It is a standard encryption algorithm in South Korea and also is internationally standardized by ISO/IEC 18033-3. Therefore, many third-party cryptanalyses have been proposed against HIGHT. Impossible differential and integral attacks are applied to reduced-round HIGHT, and especially, the impossible differential attack causes the 27-round attack, which is the current best attack under the single-key setting. In this paper, we propose some improved integral attacks against HIGHT. We first apply the division property to HIGHT and find new 19-round integral characteristics, which are improved by two rounds compared with the previous best ones. We append 9-round key recovery to these characteristics and it enables us to attack 28-round HIGHT. Its time complexity is 2127.02 where 263 chosen plaintexts and 2117 memory are required. Moreover, we can attack 29-round HIGHT if the full codebook is used, where its time and memory complexities are 2126.07 and 2118, respectively. It improves by two rounds compared with the previous best attack.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E102-A No.9 pp.1259-1271
- Publication Date
- 2019/09/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E102.A.1259
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Cryptography and Information Security
Authors
Yuki FUNABIKI
the Kobe University
Yosuke TODO
the NTT Secure Platform Laboratories
Takanori ISOBE
the University of Hyogo
Masakatu MORII
the Kobe University
Keyword
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Yuki FUNABIKI, Yosuke TODO, Takanori ISOBE, Masakatu MORII, "Improved Integral Attack on HIGHT" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E102-A, no. 9, pp. 1259-1271, September 2019, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E102.A.1259.
Abstract: HIGHT is a 64-bit block lightweight cipher, which adopts the ARX-based generalized Feistel network, and it accepts a 128-bit key. It is a standard encryption algorithm in South Korea and also is internationally standardized by ISO/IEC 18033-3. Therefore, many third-party cryptanalyses have been proposed against HIGHT. Impossible differential and integral attacks are applied to reduced-round HIGHT, and especially, the impossible differential attack causes the 27-round attack, which is the current best attack under the single-key setting. In this paper, we propose some improved integral attacks against HIGHT. We first apply the division property to HIGHT and find new 19-round integral characteristics, which are improved by two rounds compared with the previous best ones. We append 9-round key recovery to these characteristics and it enables us to attack 28-round HIGHT. Its time complexity is 2127.02 where 263 chosen plaintexts and 2117 memory are required. Moreover, we can attack 29-round HIGHT if the full codebook is used, where its time and memory complexities are 2126.07 and 2118, respectively. It improves by two rounds compared with the previous best attack.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E102.A.1259/_p
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@ARTICLE{e102-a_9_1259,
author={Yuki FUNABIKI, Yosuke TODO, Takanori ISOBE, Masakatu MORII, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Improved Integral Attack on HIGHT},
year={2019},
volume={E102-A},
number={9},
pages={1259-1271},
abstract={HIGHT is a 64-bit block lightweight cipher, which adopts the ARX-based generalized Feistel network, and it accepts a 128-bit key. It is a standard encryption algorithm in South Korea and also is internationally standardized by ISO/IEC 18033-3. Therefore, many third-party cryptanalyses have been proposed against HIGHT. Impossible differential and integral attacks are applied to reduced-round HIGHT, and especially, the impossible differential attack causes the 27-round attack, which is the current best attack under the single-key setting. In this paper, we propose some improved integral attacks against HIGHT. We first apply the division property to HIGHT and find new 19-round integral characteristics, which are improved by two rounds compared with the previous best ones. We append 9-round key recovery to these characteristics and it enables us to attack 28-round HIGHT. Its time complexity is 2127.02 where 263 chosen plaintexts and 2117 memory are required. Moreover, we can attack 29-round HIGHT if the full codebook is used, where its time and memory complexities are 2126.07 and 2118, respectively. It improves by two rounds compared with the previous best attack.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E102.A.1259},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={September},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Improved Integral Attack on HIGHT
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1259
EP - 1271
AU - Yuki FUNABIKI
AU - Yosuke TODO
AU - Takanori ISOBE
AU - Masakatu MORII
PY - 2019
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E102.A.1259
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E102-A
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - September 2019
AB - HIGHT is a 64-bit block lightweight cipher, which adopts the ARX-based generalized Feistel network, and it accepts a 128-bit key. It is a standard encryption algorithm in South Korea and also is internationally standardized by ISO/IEC 18033-3. Therefore, many third-party cryptanalyses have been proposed against HIGHT. Impossible differential and integral attacks are applied to reduced-round HIGHT, and especially, the impossible differential attack causes the 27-round attack, which is the current best attack under the single-key setting. In this paper, we propose some improved integral attacks against HIGHT. We first apply the division property to HIGHT and find new 19-round integral characteristics, which are improved by two rounds compared with the previous best ones. We append 9-round key recovery to these characteristics and it enables us to attack 28-round HIGHT. Its time complexity is 2127.02 where 263 chosen plaintexts and 2117 memory are required. Moreover, we can attack 29-round HIGHT if the full codebook is used, where its time and memory complexities are 2126.07 and 2118, respectively. It improves by two rounds compared with the previous best attack.
ER -
English
