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IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

Leakage-Resilience of Stateless/Stateful Public-Key Encryption from Hash Proofs

Manh Ha NGUYEN, Kenji YASUNAGA, Keisuke TANAKA

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Summary :

We consider the problem of constructing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes that are resilient to a-posteriori chosen-ciphertext and key-leakage attacks (LR-CCA2). In CTYPTO'09, Naor and Segev proved that the Naor-Yung generic construction of PKE which is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) is also secure against key-leakage attacks. They also presented a variant of the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, and showed that this PKE scheme is LR-CCA2-secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this paper, we apply the generic construction of “Universal Hash Proofs and a Paradigm for Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption” (EUROCRYPT'02) to generalize the above work of Naor-Segev. In comparing to the first construction of Naor-Segev, ours is more efficient because of not using simulation-sound NIZK. We also extend it to stateful PKE schemes. Concretely, we present the notion of LR-CCA2 attack in the case of stateful PKE, and a generic construction of stateful PKE that is secure against this attack.

Publication
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E96-A No.6 pp.1100-1111
Publication Date
2013/06/01
Publicized
Online ISSN
1745-1337
DOI
10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1100
Type of Manuscript
Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)
Category

Authors

Manh Ha NGUYEN
  Tokyo Institute of Techonology
Kenji YASUNAGA
  Tokyo Institute of Techonology
Keisuke TANAKA
  Tokyo Institute of Techonology

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