IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
A Hardware-Trojans Identifying Method Based on Trojan Net Scoring at Gate-Level Netlists
Summary :
Outsourcing IC design and fabrication is one of the effective solutions to reduce design cost but it may cause severe security risks. Particularly, malicious outside vendors may implement Hardware Trojans (HTs) on ICs. When we focus on IC design phase, we cannot assume an HT-free netlist or a Golden netlist and it is too difficult to identify whether a given netlist is HT-free or not. In this paper, we propose a score-based hardware-trojans identifying method at gate-level netlists without using a Golden netlist. Our proposed method does not directly detect HTs themselves in a gate-level netlist but it detects a net included in HTs, which is called Trojan net, instead. Firstly, we observe Trojan nets from several HT-inserted benchmarks and extract several their features. Secondly, we give scores to extracted Trojan net features and sum up them for each net in benchmarks. Then we can find out a score threshold to classify HT-free and HT-inserted netlists. Based on these scores, we can successfully classify HT-free and HT-inserted netlists in all the Trust-HUB gate-level benchmarks and ISCAS85 benchmarks as well as HT-free and HT-inserted AES gate-level netlists. Experimental results demonstrate that our method successfully identify all the HT-inserted gate-level benchmarks to be “HT-inserted” and all the HT-free gate-level benchmarks to be “HT-free” in approximately three hours for each benchmark.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E98-A No.12 pp.2537-2546
- Publication Date
- 2015/12/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2537
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on VLSI Design and CAD Algorithms)
- Category
- Logic Synthesis, Test and Verification
Authors
Masaru OYA
Waseda University
Youhua SHI
Waseda University
Noritaka YAMASHITA
NEC Corporation
Toshihiko OKAMURA
NEC Corporation
Yukiyasu TSUNOO
NEC Corporation
Satoshi GOTO
Waseda University
Masao YANAGISAWA
Waseda University
Nozomu TOGAWA
Waseda University
Keyword
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Masaru OYA, Youhua SHI, Noritaka YAMASHITA, Toshihiko OKAMURA, Yukiyasu TSUNOO, Satoshi GOTO, Masao YANAGISAWA, Nozomu TOGAWA, "A Hardware-Trojans Identifying Method Based on Trojan Net Scoring at Gate-Level Netlists" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E98-A, no. 12, pp. 2537-2546, December 2015, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2537.
Abstract: Outsourcing IC design and fabrication is one of the effective solutions to reduce design cost but it may cause severe security risks. Particularly, malicious outside vendors may implement Hardware Trojans (HTs) on ICs. When we focus on IC design phase, we cannot assume an HT-free netlist or a Golden netlist and it is too difficult to identify whether a given netlist is HT-free or not. In this paper, we propose a score-based hardware-trojans identifying method at gate-level netlists without using a Golden netlist. Our proposed method does not directly detect HTs themselves in a gate-level netlist but it detects a net included in HTs, which is called Trojan net, instead. Firstly, we observe Trojan nets from several HT-inserted benchmarks and extract several their features. Secondly, we give scores to extracted Trojan net features and sum up them for each net in benchmarks. Then we can find out a score threshold to classify HT-free and HT-inserted netlists. Based on these scores, we can successfully classify HT-free and HT-inserted netlists in all the Trust-HUB gate-level benchmarks and ISCAS85 benchmarks as well as HT-free and HT-inserted AES gate-level netlists. Experimental results demonstrate that our method successfully identify all the HT-inserted gate-level benchmarks to be “HT-inserted” and all the HT-free gate-level benchmarks to be “HT-free” in approximately three hours for each benchmark.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2537/_p
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@ARTICLE{e98-a_12_2537,
author={Masaru OYA, Youhua SHI, Noritaka YAMASHITA, Toshihiko OKAMURA, Yukiyasu TSUNOO, Satoshi GOTO, Masao YANAGISAWA, Nozomu TOGAWA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={A Hardware-Trojans Identifying Method Based on Trojan Net Scoring at Gate-Level Netlists},
year={2015},
volume={E98-A},
number={12},
pages={2537-2546},
abstract={Outsourcing IC design and fabrication is one of the effective solutions to reduce design cost but it may cause severe security risks. Particularly, malicious outside vendors may implement Hardware Trojans (HTs) on ICs. When we focus on IC design phase, we cannot assume an HT-free netlist or a Golden netlist and it is too difficult to identify whether a given netlist is HT-free or not. In this paper, we propose a score-based hardware-trojans identifying method at gate-level netlists without using a Golden netlist. Our proposed method does not directly detect HTs themselves in a gate-level netlist but it detects a net included in HTs, which is called Trojan net, instead. Firstly, we observe Trojan nets from several HT-inserted benchmarks and extract several their features. Secondly, we give scores to extracted Trojan net features and sum up them for each net in benchmarks. Then we can find out a score threshold to classify HT-free and HT-inserted netlists. Based on these scores, we can successfully classify HT-free and HT-inserted netlists in all the Trust-HUB gate-level benchmarks and ISCAS85 benchmarks as well as HT-free and HT-inserted AES gate-level netlists. Experimental results demonstrate that our method successfully identify all the HT-inserted gate-level benchmarks to be “HT-inserted” and all the HT-free gate-level benchmarks to be “HT-free” in approximately three hours for each benchmark.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2537},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={December},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - A Hardware-Trojans Identifying Method Based on Trojan Net Scoring at Gate-Level Netlists
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2537
EP - 2546
AU - Masaru OYA
AU - Youhua SHI
AU - Noritaka YAMASHITA
AU - Toshihiko OKAMURA
AU - Yukiyasu TSUNOO
AU - Satoshi GOTO
AU - Masao YANAGISAWA
AU - Nozomu TOGAWA
PY - 2015
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2537
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E98-A
IS - 12
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - December 2015
AB - Outsourcing IC design and fabrication is one of the effective solutions to reduce design cost but it may cause severe security risks. Particularly, malicious outside vendors may implement Hardware Trojans (HTs) on ICs. When we focus on IC design phase, we cannot assume an HT-free netlist or a Golden netlist and it is too difficult to identify whether a given netlist is HT-free or not. In this paper, we propose a score-based hardware-trojans identifying method at gate-level netlists without using a Golden netlist. Our proposed method does not directly detect HTs themselves in a gate-level netlist but it detects a net included in HTs, which is called Trojan net, instead. Firstly, we observe Trojan nets from several HT-inserted benchmarks and extract several their features. Secondly, we give scores to extracted Trojan net features and sum up them for each net in benchmarks. Then we can find out a score threshold to classify HT-free and HT-inserted netlists. Based on these scores, we can successfully classify HT-free and HT-inserted netlists in all the Trust-HUB gate-level benchmarks and ISCAS85 benchmarks as well as HT-free and HT-inserted AES gate-level netlists. Experimental results demonstrate that our method successfully identify all the HT-inserted gate-level benchmarks to be “HT-inserted” and all the HT-free gate-level benchmarks to be “HT-free” in approximately three hours for each benchmark.
ER -
English
