Auctions are a critical element of the electronic commerce infrastructure. But for real-time applications, auctions are a potential problem - they can cause significant time delays. Thus, for most real-time applications, sealed-bid auctions are recommended. But how do we handle tie-breaking in sealed-bid auctions? This paper analyzes the use of multi-round auctions where the winners from an auction round participate in a subsequent tie-breaking second auction round. We perform this analysis over the classical first-price sealed-bid auction that has been modified to provide full anonymity. We analyze the expected number of rounds and optimal values to minimize communication costs.
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Hiroaki KIKUCHI, Michael HAKAVY, Doug TYGAR, "Multi-Round Anonymous Auction Protocols" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E82-D, no. 4, pp. 769-777, April 1999, doi: .
Abstract: Auctions are a critical element of the electronic commerce infrastructure. But for real-time applications, auctions are a potential problem - they can cause significant time delays. Thus, for most real-time applications, sealed-bid auctions are recommended. But how do we handle tie-breaking in sealed-bid auctions? This paper analyzes the use of multi-round auctions where the winners from an auction round participate in a subsequent tie-breaking second auction round. We perform this analysis over the classical first-price sealed-bid auction that has been modified to provide full anonymity. We analyze the expected number of rounds and optimal values to minimize communication costs.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/e82-d_4_769/_p
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@ARTICLE{e82-d_4_769,
author={Hiroaki KIKUCHI, Michael HAKAVY, Doug TYGAR, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Multi-Round Anonymous Auction Protocols},
year={1999},
volume={E82-D},
number={4},
pages={769-777},
abstract={Auctions are a critical element of the electronic commerce infrastructure. But for real-time applications, auctions are a potential problem - they can cause significant time delays. Thus, for most real-time applications, sealed-bid auctions are recommended. But how do we handle tie-breaking in sealed-bid auctions? This paper analyzes the use of multi-round auctions where the winners from an auction round participate in a subsequent tie-breaking second auction round. We perform this analysis over the classical first-price sealed-bid auction that has been modified to provide full anonymity. We analyze the expected number of rounds and optimal values to minimize communication costs.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={April},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Multi-Round Anonymous Auction Protocols
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 769
EP - 777
AU - Hiroaki KIKUCHI
AU - Michael HAKAVY
AU - Doug TYGAR
PY - 1999
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN -
VL - E82-D
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - April 1999
AB - Auctions are a critical element of the electronic commerce infrastructure. But for real-time applications, auctions are a potential problem - they can cause significant time delays. Thus, for most real-time applications, sealed-bid auctions are recommended. But how do we handle tie-breaking in sealed-bid auctions? This paper analyzes the use of multi-round auctions where the winners from an auction round participate in a subsequent tie-breaking second auction round. We perform this analysis over the classical first-price sealed-bid auction that has been modified to provide full anonymity. We analyze the expected number of rounds and optimal values to minimize communication costs.
ER -