IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
A Security Enhanced 5G Authentication Scheme for Insecure Channel
Summary :
More and more attacks are found due to the insecure channel between different network domains in legacy mobile network. In this letter, we discover an attack exploiting SUCI to track a subscriber in 5G network, which is directly caused by the insecure air channel. To cover this issue, a secure authentication scheme is proposed utilizing the existing PKI mechanism. Not only dose our protocol ensure the authentication signalling security in the channel between UE and SN, but also SN and HN. Further, formal methods are adopted to prove the security of the proposed protocol.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E103-D No.3 pp.711-713
- Publication Date
- 2020/03/01
- Publicized
- 2019/12/11
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1361
- DOI
- 10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8190
- Type of Manuscript
- LETTER
- Category
- Information Network
Authors
Xinxin HU
Information Engineering University
Caixia LIU
Information Engineering University
Shuxin LIU
Information Engineering University
Xiaotao CHENG
Information Engineering University
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Xinxin HU, Caixia LIU, Shuxin LIU, Xiaotao CHENG, "A Security Enhanced 5G Authentication Scheme for Insecure Channel" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E103-D, no. 3, pp. 711-713, March 2020, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8190.
Abstract: More and more attacks are found due to the insecure channel between different network domains in legacy mobile network. In this letter, we discover an attack exploiting SUCI to track a subscriber in 5G network, which is directly caused by the insecure air channel. To cover this issue, a secure authentication scheme is proposed utilizing the existing PKI mechanism. Not only dose our protocol ensure the authentication signalling security in the channel between UE and SN, but also SN and HN. Further, formal methods are adopted to prove the security of the proposed protocol.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8190/_p
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@ARTICLE{e103-d_3_711,
author={Xinxin HU, Caixia LIU, Shuxin LIU, Xiaotao CHENG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={A Security Enhanced 5G Authentication Scheme for Insecure Channel},
year={2020},
volume={E103-D},
number={3},
pages={711-713},
abstract={More and more attacks are found due to the insecure channel between different network domains in legacy mobile network. In this letter, we discover an attack exploiting SUCI to track a subscriber in 5G network, which is directly caused by the insecure air channel. To cover this issue, a secure authentication scheme is proposed utilizing the existing PKI mechanism. Not only dose our protocol ensure the authentication signalling security in the channel between UE and SN, but also SN and HN. Further, formal methods are adopted to prove the security of the proposed protocol.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8190},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={March},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - A Security Enhanced 5G Authentication Scheme for Insecure Channel
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 711
EP - 713
AU - Xinxin HU
AU - Caixia LIU
AU - Shuxin LIU
AU - Xiaotao CHENG
PY - 2020
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8190
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E103-D
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - March 2020
AB - More and more attacks are found due to the insecure channel between different network domains in legacy mobile network. In this letter, we discover an attack exploiting SUCI to track a subscriber in 5G network, which is directly caused by the insecure air channel. To cover this issue, a secure authentication scheme is proposed utilizing the existing PKI mechanism. Not only dose our protocol ensure the authentication signalling security in the channel between UE and SN, but also SN and HN. Further, formal methods are adopted to prove the security of the proposed protocol.
ER -
English
