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A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage
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In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a “fund binding” property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides a fund binding property, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al., CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E107-D No.5 pp.615-624
- Publication Date
- 2024/05/01
- Publicized
- 2024/02/06
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1361
- DOI
- 10.1587/transinf.2023DAP0002
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Data Engineering and Information Management)
- Category
Authors
Kota CHIN
University of Tsukuba
Keita EMURA
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
Shingo SATO
Yokohama National University
Kazumasa OMOTE
University of Tsukuba
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Kota CHIN, Keita EMURA, Shingo SATO, Kazumasa OMOTE, "A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E107-D, no. 5, pp. 615-624, May 2024, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2023DAP0002.
Abstract: In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a “fund binding” property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides a fund binding property, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al., CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2023DAP0002/_f
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@ARTICLE{e107-d_5_615,
author={Kota CHIN, Keita EMURA, Shingo SATO, Kazumasa OMOTE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage},
year={2024},
volume={E107-D},
number={5},
pages={615-624},
abstract={In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a “fund binding” property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides a fund binding property, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al., CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2023DAP0002},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={May},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 615
EP - 624
AU - Kota CHIN
AU - Keita EMURA
AU - Shingo SATO
AU - Kazumasa OMOTE
PY - 2024
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2023DAP0002
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E107-D
IS - 5
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - May 2024
AB - In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a “fund binding” property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides a fund binding property, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al., CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.
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English
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