Detailed Cost Estimation of CNTW Forgery Attack against EMV Signature Scheme

Tetsuya IZU; Yumi SAKEMI; Masahiko TAKENAKA

doi:10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2111

Detailed Cost Estimation of CNTW Forgery Attack against EMV Signature Scheme

Tetsuya IZU, Yumi SAKEMI, Masahiko TAKENAKA

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EMV signature is one of specifications for authenticating credit and debit card data, which is based on ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature scheme. At CRYPTO 2009, Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi, and Weinmann proposed a new forgery attack against the signature ISO/IEC 9796-2 (CNTW attack) [2]. They also briefly discussed the possibility when the attack is applied to the EMV signatures. They showed that the forging cost is $45,000 and concluded that the attack could not forge them for operational reason. However their results are derived from not fully analysis under only one condition. The condition they adopt is typical case. For security evaluation, fully analysis and an estimation in worst case are needed. This paper shows cost-estimation of CNTW attack against EMV signature in detail. We constitute an evaluate model and show cost-estimations under all conditions that Coron et al. do not estimate. As results, this paper contribute on two points. One is that our detailed estimation reduced the forgery cost from $45,000 to $35,200 with same condition as [2]. Another is to clarify a fact that EMV signature can be forged with less than $2,000 according to a condition. This fact shows that CNTW attack might be a realistic threat.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E94-D No.11 pp.2111-2118

Publication Date: 2011/11/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1361

DOI: 10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2111

Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Information and Communication System Security)

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Tetsuya IZU, Yumi SAKEMI, Masahiko TAKENAKA, "Detailed Cost Estimation of CNTW Forgery Attack against EMV Signature Scheme" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information, vol. E94-D, no. 11, pp. 2111-2118, November 2011, doi: 10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2111.
Abstract: EMV signature is one of specifications for authenticating credit and debit card data, which is based on ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature scheme. At CRYPTO 2009, Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi, and Weinmann proposed a new forgery attack against the signature ISO/IEC 9796-2 (CNTW attack) [2]. They also briefly discussed the possibility when the attack is applied to the EMV signatures. They showed that the forging cost is $45,000 and concluded that the attack could not forge them for operational reason. However their results are derived from not fully analysis under only one condition. The condition they adopt is typical case. For security evaluation, fully analysis and an estimation in worst case are needed. This paper shows cost-estimation of CNTW attack against EMV signature in detail. We constitute an evaluate model and show cost-estimations under all conditions that Coron et al. do not estimate. As results, this paper contribute on two points. One is that our detailed estimation reduced the forgery cost from $45,000 to $35,200 with same condition as [2]. Another is to clarify a fact that EMV signature can be forged with less than $2,000 according to a condition. This fact shows that CNTW attack might be a realistic threat.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2111/_p

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@ARTICLE{e94-d_11_2111,
author={Tetsuya IZU, Yumi SAKEMI, Masahiko TAKENAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Detailed Cost Estimation of CNTW Forgery Attack against EMV Signature Scheme},
year={2011},
volume={E94-D},
number={11},
pages={2111-2118},
abstract={EMV signature is one of specifications for authenticating credit and debit card data, which is based on ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature scheme. At CRYPTO 2009, Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi, and Weinmann proposed a new forgery attack against the signature ISO/IEC 9796-2 (CNTW attack) [2]. They also briefly discussed the possibility when the attack is applied to the EMV signatures. They showed that the forging cost is $45,000 and concluded that the attack could not forge them for operational reason. However their results are derived from not fully analysis under only one condition. The condition they adopt is typical case. For security evaluation, fully analysis and an estimation in worst case are needed. This paper shows cost-estimation of CNTW attack against EMV signature in detail. We constitute an evaluate model and show cost-estimations under all conditions that Coron et al. do not estimate. As results, this paper contribute on two points. One is that our detailed estimation reduced the forgery cost from $45,000 to $35,200 with same condition as [2]. Another is to clarify a fact that EMV signature can be forged with less than $2,000 according to a condition. This fact shows that CNTW attack might be a realistic threat.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2111},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={November},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Detailed Cost Estimation of CNTW Forgery Attack against EMV Signature Scheme
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 2111
EP - 2118
AU - Tetsuya IZU
AU - Yumi SAKEMI
AU - Masahiko TAKENAKA
PY - 2011
DO - 10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2111
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E94-D
IS - 11
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - November 2011
AB - EMV signature is one of specifications for authenticating credit and debit card data, which is based on ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature scheme. At CRYPTO 2009, Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi, and Weinmann proposed a new forgery attack against the signature ISO/IEC 9796-2 (CNTW attack) [2]. They also briefly discussed the possibility when the attack is applied to the EMV signatures. They showed that the forging cost is $45,000 and concluded that the attack could not forge them for operational reason. However their results are derived from not fully analysis under only one condition. The condition they adopt is typical case. For security evaluation, fully analysis and an estimation in worst case are needed. This paper shows cost-estimation of CNTW attack against EMV signature in detail. We constitute an evaluate model and show cost-estimations under all conditions that Coron et al. do not estimate. As results, this paper contribute on two points. One is that our detailed estimation reduced the forgery cost from $45,000 to $35,200 with same condition as [2]. Another is to clarify a fact that EMV signature can be forged with less than $2,000 according to a condition. This fact shows that CNTW attack might be a realistic threat.
ER -