IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Combinatorial Auction-Based Marketplace Mechanism for Cloud Service Reservation
Summary :
This paper proposes a combinatorial auction-based marketplace mechanism for cloud computing services, which allows users to reserve arbitrary combination of services at requested timeslots, prices and quality of service. The proposed mechanism helps enterprise users build workflow applications in a cloud computing environment, specifically on the platform-as-a-service, where the users need to compose multiple types of services at different timeslots. The proposed marketplace mechanism consists of a forward market for an advance reservation and a spot market for immediate allocation of services. Each market employs mixed integer programming to enforce a Pareto optimum allocation with maximized social economic welfare, as well as double-sided auction design to encourage both users and providers to compete for buying and selling the services. The evaluation results show that (1) the proposed forward/combinatorial mechanism outperforms other non-combinatorial and/or non-reservation (spot) mechanisms in both user-centric rationality and global efficiency, and (2) running both a forward market and a spot market improves utilization without disturbing advance reservations depending on the provider's policy.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E95-D No.1 pp.192-204
- Publication Date
- 2012/01/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1361
- DOI
- 10.1587/transinf.E95.D.192
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Computer System
Authors
Keyword
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Ikki FUJIWARA, Kento AIDA, Isao ONO, "Combinatorial Auction-Based Marketplace Mechanism for Cloud Service Reservation" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E95-D, no. 1, pp. 192-204, January 2012, doi: 10.1587/transinf.E95.D.192.
Abstract: This paper proposes a combinatorial auction-based marketplace mechanism for cloud computing services, which allows users to reserve arbitrary combination of services at requested timeslots, prices and quality of service. The proposed mechanism helps enterprise users build workflow applications in a cloud computing environment, specifically on the platform-as-a-service, where the users need to compose multiple types of services at different timeslots. The proposed marketplace mechanism consists of a forward market for an advance reservation and a spot market for immediate allocation of services. Each market employs mixed integer programming to enforce a Pareto optimum allocation with maximized social economic welfare, as well as double-sided auction design to encourage both users and providers to compete for buying and selling the services. The evaluation results show that (1) the proposed forward/combinatorial mechanism outperforms other non-combinatorial and/or non-reservation (spot) mechanisms in both user-centric rationality and global efficiency, and (2) running both a forward market and a spot market improves utilization without disturbing advance reservations depending on the provider's policy.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.E95.D.192/_p
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@ARTICLE{e95-d_1_192,
author={Ikki FUJIWARA, Kento AIDA, Isao ONO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Combinatorial Auction-Based Marketplace Mechanism for Cloud Service Reservation},
year={2012},
volume={E95-D},
number={1},
pages={192-204},
abstract={This paper proposes a combinatorial auction-based marketplace mechanism for cloud computing services, which allows users to reserve arbitrary combination of services at requested timeslots, prices and quality of service. The proposed mechanism helps enterprise users build workflow applications in a cloud computing environment, specifically on the platform-as-a-service, where the users need to compose multiple types of services at different timeslots. The proposed marketplace mechanism consists of a forward market for an advance reservation and a spot market for immediate allocation of services. Each market employs mixed integer programming to enforce a Pareto optimum allocation with maximized social economic welfare, as well as double-sided auction design to encourage both users and providers to compete for buying and selling the services. The evaluation results show that (1) the proposed forward/combinatorial mechanism outperforms other non-combinatorial and/or non-reservation (spot) mechanisms in both user-centric rationality and global efficiency, and (2) running both a forward market and a spot market improves utilization without disturbing advance reservations depending on the provider's policy.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.E95.D.192},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={January},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Combinatorial Auction-Based Marketplace Mechanism for Cloud Service Reservation
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 192
EP - 204
AU - Ikki FUJIWARA
AU - Kento AIDA
AU - Isao ONO
PY - 2012
DO - 10.1587/transinf.E95.D.192
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E95-D
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - January 2012
AB - This paper proposes a combinatorial auction-based marketplace mechanism for cloud computing services, which allows users to reserve arbitrary combination of services at requested timeslots, prices and quality of service. The proposed mechanism helps enterprise users build workflow applications in a cloud computing environment, specifically on the platform-as-a-service, where the users need to compose multiple types of services at different timeslots. The proposed marketplace mechanism consists of a forward market for an advance reservation and a spot market for immediate allocation of services. Each market employs mixed integer programming to enforce a Pareto optimum allocation with maximized social economic welfare, as well as double-sided auction design to encourage both users and providers to compete for buying and selling the services. The evaluation results show that (1) the proposed forward/combinatorial mechanism outperforms other non-combinatorial and/or non-reservation (spot) mechanisms in both user-centric rationality and global efficiency, and (2) running both a forward market and a spot market improves utilization without disturbing advance reservations depending on the provider's policy.
ER -
English
