In this letter, we investigate the physical layer security in multi-user multi-relay networks, where each relay is not merely a traditional helper, but at the same time, can become a potential eavesdropper. We first propose an efficient low-complexity user and relay selection scheme to significantly reduce the amount of channel estimation as well as the amount of potential links for comparison. For the proposed scheme, we derive the closed-form expression for the lower bound of ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) to evaluate the system secrecy performance. Simulation results are provided to verify the validity of our expressions and demonstrate how the ESR scales with the number of users and relays.

This paper investigates the spectrum allocation problem. Under the current spectrum management mode, large amount of spectrum resource is wasted due to uncertainty of user's demand. To reduce the impact of uncertainty, a presale mechanism is designed based on spectrum pool. In this mechanism, the spectrum manager provides spectrum resource at a favorable price for presale aiming at sharing with user the risk caused by uncertainty of demand. Because of the hierarchical characteristic, we build a spectrum market Stackelberg game, in which the manager acts as leader and user as follower. Then proof of the uniqueness and optimality of Stackelberg Equilibrium is given. Simulation results show the presale mechanism can promote profits for both sides and reduce temporary scheduling.