Traditional double auction protocols only concern the price information of participants without considering their QoS requirements, which makes them unsuitable for the service grid. In this paper we first introduce QoS information into double auction to present the QoS-enabled Double Auction Protocol (QDAP). QDAP tries to assign the asks which have the least candidate bids firstly to make more participants trade and provides QoS guarantee at the same time. Simulation experiments have been performed to compare QDAP with two traditional double auction protocols and the result shows that QDAP is more suitable for the service grid.

This paper investigates the spectrum allocation problem. Under the current spectrum management mode, large amount of spectrum resource is wasted due to uncertainty of user's demand. To reduce the impact of uncertainty, a presale mechanism is designed based on spectrum pool. In this mechanism, the spectrum manager provides spectrum resource at a favorable price for presale aiming at sharing with user the risk caused by uncertainty of demand. Because of the hierarchical characteristic, we build a spectrum market Stackelberg game, in which the manager acts as leader and user as follower. Then proof of the uniqueness and optimality of Stackelberg Equilibrium is given. Simulation results show the presale mechanism can promote profits for both sides and reduce temporary scheduling.