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In this paper, we first prove beyond-birthyday-bound security for the Misty structure. Specifically, we show that an r-round Misty structure is secure against CCA attacks up to $O(2^{rac{rn}{r+7}})$ query complexity, where n is the size of each round permutation. So for any ε>0, a sufficient number of rounds would guarantee the security of the Misty structure up to 2n(1-ε) query complexity.
Dukjae MOON Deukjo HONG Daesung KWON Seokhie HONG
We assume that the domain extender is the Merkle-Damgård (MD) scheme and he message is padded by a ‘1', and minimum number of ‘0' s, followed by a fixed size length information so that the length of padded message is multiple of block length. Under this assumption, we analyze securities of the hash mode when the compression function follows the Davies-Meyer (DM) scheme and the underlying block cipher is one of the plain Feistel or Misty scheme or the generalized Feistel or Misty schemes with Substitution-Permutation (SP) round function. We do this work based on Meet-in-the-Middle (MitM) preimage attack techniques, and develop several useful initial structures.
Yukiyasu TSUNOO Teruo SAITO Takeshi KAWABATA Hirokatsu NAKAGAWA
MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it is recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. In this paper, we report on 12th order differentials in 3-round MISTY1 with FL functions and 44th order differentials in 4-round MISTY1 with FL functions both previously unknown. We also report that both data complexity and computational complexity of higher order differential attacks on 6-round MISTY1 with FL functions and 7-round MISTY1 with FL functions using the 46th order differential can be reduced to as much as 1/22 of the previous values by using multiple 44th order differentials simultaneously.
In this paper, we study the security of the Misty structure, where each round function is chosen at random from the set of involutions. Based on the game-playing framework, we prove the pseudorandomness of the 3-round R-Misty structure and the 4-round L-Misty structure as well as the super-pseudorandomness of the 5-round R-Misty structure for m
Yukiyasu TSUNOO Teruo SAITO Maki SHIGERI Takeshi KAWABATA
MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it has been recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. This paper shows that higher order differential attacks can be successful against 7-round versions of MISTY1 with FL functions. The attack on 7-round MISTY1 can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 254.1 and a computational complexity of 2120.8, which signifies the first successful attack on 7-round MISTY1 with no limitation such as a weak key. This paper also evaluates the complexity of this higher order differential attack on MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function. It is shown that resistance to the higher order differential attack is not substantially improved even in 7-round MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function.
Dai YAMAMOTO Jun YAJIMA Kouichi ITOH
This paper proposes a compact hardware (H/W) implementation for the MISTY1 block cipher, which is one of the ISO/IEC 18033-3 standard encryption algorithms. In designing the compact H/W, we focused on optimizing the implementation of FO/FI/FL functions, which are the main components of MISTY1. For this optimization, we propose three new methods; reducing temporary registers for the FO function, shortening the critical path for the FI function, and merging the FL/FL-1 functions. According to our logic synthesis on a 0.18-µm CMOS standard cell library based on our proposed methods, the gate size is 3.4 Kgates, which is the smallest as far as we know.
Yukiyasu TSUNOO Teruo SAITO Hiroki NAKASHIMA Maki SHIGERI
MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it has been recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. This paper reports a previously unknown higher order differential characteristic of 4-round MISTY1 with the FL functions. It also shows that a higher order differential attack that utilizes this newly discovered characteristic is successful against 6-round MISTY1 with the FL functions. This attack can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 253.7 and a computational complexity of 264.4, which is better than any previous cryptanalysis of MISTY1.
Jongsung KIM Changhoon LEE Jaechul SUNG Seokhie HONG Sangjin LEE Jongin LIM
The design and analysis of block ciphers is an established field of study which has seen significant progress since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, what remains on an interesting direction to explore in this area is to design block ciphers with provable security against powerful known attacks such as differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper we introduce seven new block cipher structures, named Feistel-variant A, B, CLEFIA and MISTY-FO-variant A, B, C, D structures, and show that these structures are provably resistant against differential cryptanalysis. The main results of this paper are that the average differential probabilities over at least 2 rounds of Feistel-variant A structure and 1 round of Feistel-variant B structure are both upperbounded by p2, while the average differential probabilities over at least 5 rounds of CLEFIA, MISTY-FO-variant A, B, C and D structures are upperbounded by p4+2p5, p4, p4, 2p4 and 2p4, respectively, if the maximum differential probability of a round F function is p. We also give provable security for the Feistel-variant A, B and CLEFIA structures against linear cryptanalysis. Our results are attained under the assumption that all of components in our proposed structures are bijective. We expect that our results are useful to design block ciphers with provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
Eunjin LEE Jongsung KIM Deukjo HONG Changhoon LEE Jaechul SUNG Seokhie HONG Jongin LIM
In 1997, M. Matsui proposed secret-key cryptosystems called MISTY 1 and MISTY 2, which are 8- and 12-round block ciphers with a 64-bit block, and a 128-bit key. They are designed based on the principle of provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper we present large collections of weak-key classes encompassing 273 and 270 weak keys for 7-round MISTY 1 and 2 for which they are vulnerable to a related-key amplified boomerang attack. Under our weak-key assumptions, the related-key amplified boomerang attack can be applied to 7-round MISTY 1 and 2 with 254, 256 chosen plaintexts and 255.3 7-round MISTY 1 encryptions, 265 7-round MISTY 2 encryptions, respectively.
It is known that a super-pseudorandom permutation can be constructed from a pseudorandom function f and two universal hash functions, h and h′. It is a four round Feistel permutation denoted by φ(hk,f,f,h′k′). In this paper, we show how to re-use the secret key for f in this construction. Specifically, we show that (1) the same key can be used for both h and h′, and (2) the key for h and h′can be derived from f. As a result, our construction requires only the key for f as a secret key, and it preserves computational efficiency and security. We show the full security proof of our construction. Also, we derive a similar result for a five round MISTY-type permutation.
Yasuo HATANO Hidema TANAKA Toshinobu KANEKO
In this paper, we describe a technique for optimizing the algebraic method that is applied to higher order differential attack. The higher order differential attack is a well-known attack on block ciphers, in which we derive an attack equation to determine a round key from a property of a higher order differential of a target block cipher. The algebraic method is a linearization of the attack equation and determines the true key by a method such as Gaussian elimination. Our technique is based on linear dependency and can reduce the complexity of that method. We also describe a technique that allows the algebraic method to be used as an attack equation that holds probabilistically. We demonstrate this method by attacking a five-round MISTY1 and show that it needs 221.6 chosen plaintexts and 228.0 encryption times. The computer simulation took about two minutes to complete.
Tetsu IWATA Tomonobu YOSHINO Tomohiro YUASA Kaoru KUROSAWA
The security of an iterated block cipher heavily depends on its structure as well as each round function. Matsui showed that MISTY type structure is faster and more robust than Feistel structure in terms of its resistance against linear and differential cryptanalysis. On the other hand, Luby and Rackoff proved that the four round Feistel structure is super-pseudorandom if each round function fi is a random function. This paper proves that the five round MISTY type structure is super-pseudorandom. We also characterize its round security.
In this paper, we show two methods for fast software implementations of block cipher algorithm MISTY1 on Digital Alpha processors. One is based on the method proposed by Biham at the fourth Fast Software Encryption Workshop. This method, which is called "bitslice," realizes high performance by regarding the target cipher as a collection of logic gates and processing plural blocks in parallel, although its data format is non-standard. The other is standard implementation where all modes of operation are available. We analyze the architecture of Alpha and discuss how to optimize MISTY1 on the processor. As a result, our assembly language programs achieved an encryption speed of 288 Mbps for the bitslice version and 105 Mbps for the standard version, respectively, on Alpha 21164A (500 MHz).