Security of Sequential Multiple Encryption
Summary :
This paper analyzes security of sequential multiple encryptions based on asymmetric key encryptions, and shows that a sequential construction of secure multiple encryptions exists. The sequential multiple encryption scheme can be proved to be indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks for multiple encryptions (IND-ME-CCA), where the adversary can access to the decryption oracle of the multiple encryption, even when all the underlying encryptions of the multiple encryption are indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). We provide an extended security notion of sequential multiple encryptions, in which the adversary is allowed to access decryption oracles of the underlying encryptions in addition to the multiple encryption, and show that our constructed scheme satisfies the security notion when all the underlying encryptions are indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA).
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E95-A No.1 pp.57-69
- Publication Date
- 2012/01/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.57
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
- Category
- Public Key Cryptography
Authors
Keyword
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Atsushi FUJIOKA, Yoshiaki OKAMOTO, Taiichi SAITO, "Security of Sequential Multiple Encryption" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E95-A, no. 1, pp. 57-69, January 2012, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.57.
Abstract: This paper analyzes security of sequential multiple encryptions based on asymmetric key encryptions, and shows that a sequential construction of secure multiple encryptions exists. The sequential multiple encryption scheme can be proved to be indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks for multiple encryptions (IND-ME-CCA), where the adversary can access to the decryption oracle of the multiple encryption, even when all the underlying encryptions of the multiple encryption are indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). We provide an extended security notion of sequential multiple encryptions, in which the adversary is allowed to access decryption oracles of the underlying encryptions in addition to the multiple encryption, and show that our constructed scheme satisfies the security notion when all the underlying encryptions are indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA).
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E95.A.57/_p
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@ARTICLE{e95-a_1_57,
author={Atsushi FUJIOKA, Yoshiaki OKAMOTO, Taiichi SAITO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Security of Sequential Multiple Encryption},
year={2012},
volume={E95-A},
number={1},
pages={57-69},
abstract={This paper analyzes security of sequential multiple encryptions based on asymmetric key encryptions, and shows that a sequential construction of secure multiple encryptions exists. The sequential multiple encryption scheme can be proved to be indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks for multiple encryptions (IND-ME-CCA), where the adversary can access to the decryption oracle of the multiple encryption, even when all the underlying encryptions of the multiple encryption are indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). We provide an extended security notion of sequential multiple encryptions, in which the adversary is allowed to access decryption oracles of the underlying encryptions in addition to the multiple encryption, and show that our constructed scheme satisfies the security notion when all the underlying encryptions are indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA).},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E95.A.57},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Security of Sequential Multiple Encryption
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 57
EP - 69
AU - Atsushi FUJIOKA
AU - Yoshiaki OKAMOTO
AU - Taiichi SAITO
PY - 2012
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.57
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E95-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2012
AB - This paper analyzes security of sequential multiple encryptions based on asymmetric key encryptions, and shows that a sequential construction of secure multiple encryptions exists. The sequential multiple encryption scheme can be proved to be indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks for multiple encryptions (IND-ME-CCA), where the adversary can access to the decryption oracle of the multiple encryption, even when all the underlying encryptions of the multiple encryption are indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). We provide an extended security notion of sequential multiple encryptions, in which the adversary is allowed to access decryption oracles of the underlying encryptions in addition to the multiple encryption, and show that our constructed scheme satisfies the security notion when all the underlying encryptions are indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA).
ER -
English
